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Back around the turn of the century, the head of the United States Patent
Office suggested that the time might have come to close his bureau down. His
reason was simple: there would be no more useful patents, because all the
inventions had been made.
The literature on abortion is like that too: one longs for something new, an
idea that will shake things up, but as each new article or book comes out, one
is left with the dreadful and yet unavoidable sense that everything has been
said. Not only that, but most of it was said ten years ago. Whatever arguments
for free choice Justice Blackmun might have omitted in his comprehensive but
unsatisfying majority opinion in Roe v. Wade1 have long since been filled in,
and the basic pro-life argument, that the fetus should be protected for its real
or potential personhood, is restated in lots of clever ways but is still only
restated. As eyes glaze over, it often has seemed during the past two decades
that only the names of the authors who offer the arguments have changed.
* Tyler Professor of Constitutional Law, Harvard Law School
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1. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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If the scholarship on abortion has changed little, the politics of abortion
have changed much. As a constitutional precedent, Roe stands out as a political
failure. This judgment has nothing to do with the constitutional argumentation
that undergirds the decision, still less to do with the correct answer to the moral
question that abortion starkly poses; rather, it reflects the simple and remarkable
reality that as Roe approaches the end of its second decade as law of the land,
there are tens of millions of Americans who are quite unembarrassed about
disagreeing quite openly with the decision, and it is still possible (and, for some
politicians, even sensible) to run against it. Take a watershed decision with
which Roe is often compared: Brown v. Board of Education.' As controversial
as Brown was in its time, within a good deal less than twenty years it was no
longer politically respectable to run a campaign that argued explicitly that the
decision should be overturned. One might resort to all sorts of code words, of
course, and one might counsel the most outrageous forms of legal circum-
vention, but two decades after Brown one could not build a political career on
the proposition that racial integration was wrong, and, certainly, no President
could have been elected on a platform expressly calling for its reversal. But
today, 18 years after Roe, there are districts in nearly every state where an
explicit anti-abortion platform is not only useful, but actually required, and, for
presidential candidates, running and winning on anti-abortion platforms has
recently been the rule, not the exception.'
But that is only one part of the political reality, the part that marks the
Supreme Court's decision in Roe as a failure. There is another reality that
marks the idea underlying Roe, the vision of reproduction as personal choice,
as a clear, if still fragile, political success. After running comfortably and
risklessly against Roe for years, hundreds or perhaps thousands of pro-life
politicians-mostly, but not exclusively, drawn from the ranks of conservative
Republicans-suddenly find themselves in the unexpected and, as it turns out,
often unwanted position of being able to do something about it. This is because
the Supreme Court, in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services,4 dumped much
of the abortion question back where the pro-life movement had always said that
it should be: in the laps of the states. The immediate result was that pro-choice
forces discovered that their fears and rhetoric were equally unfounded: most
Americans didn't want their governments to exercise the restrictive authority
against which pro-choice forces had always warned. As for the pro-life forces,
2. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
3. Nothing in this argument turns on whether voters are deeply influenced by the candidate's stance
on abortion; for example, many pro-choice voters no doubt supported Presidents Reagan and Bush, both
of whom ran pro-life campaigns. The point, rather, is simply that it is politically respectable to run a
campaign that calls for the reversal of Roe.
4. 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989).
2748 [Vol. 100: 2747
Abortion and Absolutism
they found that the public that voted for them was less ready than they sup-
posed to turn political slogans into political action.'
Less ready is not the same as unready, however, and many states (Louisiana
recently to the fore) have seen movements to place very restrictive abortion
laws on the books. As with any other practice that the state is allowed to
regulate, the content of the "right" to decide whether to end a pregnancy now
varies from one state to the next. Pro-choice forces point to this as a problem,
but at least it accords with the old argument that federalism allows the states
to serve as laboratories in which social policies can be tested on a small scale
before being adopted in the large. Whatever one's view of Roe, however, the
result that a pregnant woman might face markedly different laws in different
states is plainly offensive to the idea that the right to decide whether to end a
pregnancy is a right of constitutional dimension.
Still, by returning many aspects of abortion regulation to the legislatures,
Webster might be envisioned as a vehicle for enhancing the possibility that new
laws might move through deadlocked legislatures. But as every student of
legislative process knows, the heavier burden is on those wishing to change the
status quo, not those wishing to preserve it; concomitantly, it is naive to suggest
that a refusal to enact a new statute or change an old one represents the will
of the people. Quite apart from any question of the distribution and intensity
of preferences, it is the pro-life forces, seeking to change the law, who face the
more difficult legislative task, because the pro-choice forces, except in those
states where there are serious legislative threats to gains in reproductive free-
dom, have little incentive to compromise.
6
Besides, many of the battle-lines may have hardened rather than softened
in the wake of Webster, because now that so much of the fight is in the state
legislatures, the angry, polemical street demonstrations on both sides of the
issue make a good deal more sense than they did when the matter was entirely
before the courts: political pressure is what legislators are supposed to notice.
And although pro-life forces prevail in some states, pro-choice forces in others,
there is no sense in which one can say that the two sides are holding a dia-
logue. Because they can see no common ground, then, there is a political void
to match the void in scholarship.
Laurence Tribe seeks to fill both voids with Abortion: The Clash of Abso-
lutes,7 an ambitious but ultimately unsatisfying effort to explain (and justify)
5. In this review, I use the words "pro-choice" and "pro-life" because these are the names that the
movements have in recent years most frequently applied to themselves. I recognize that the pro-life
movement says that the pro-choice movement should be labeled "pro-abortion" or even "pro-death," and
that the pro-choice movement says that the pro-life movement should be labeled "anti-abortion" or even
"anti-woman," but absent the risk of a total collapse of the language, I am willing to let movements choose
their own labels.
6. For an argument that pro-choice forces shouldn't compromise, see Dellinger, Should We Compromise
on Abortion?, THE AMERICAN PROSPECT, Summer 1990.
7. L. TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES (1990) [hereinafter cited by page number only].
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the constitutional theory of reproductive freedom. The book, plainly written
with a lay audience in mind, is a readable and provocative treatment of the
problem, as one has come to expect from the prolific Tribe. I think that anyone
seriously interested in the subject of abortion will benefit from reading this
book, but I fear that the reader (especially the reader whose predispositions are
pro-life rather than pro-choice) will likely come away frustrated, convinced (as
Tribe's title suggests) that there is no room for compromise.
Still, Tribe tries to find one; indeed, the book is motivated by the idea that
there is a set of shared interests between the competing forces. According to
.Tribe, "[o]ur national institutions are braced for a seemingly endless clash of
absolutes."8 Tribe tells us, however, that his goal is to build a bridge between
the pro-life and pro-choice forces, to supply the common ground that is now
missing. Few issues are as morally searing as abortion, so teasing out compro-
mise is an important and laudable goal; the only difficulty with the way Tribe
does it is, as I shall show, that in seeking to construct his bridge, he gradually
allows the pro-choice arguments to dominate his narrative, so that by the end
of the book, when the rhetoric becomes almost ringingly pro-choice, the
adamantly pro-life readers to whom he is so plainly reaching out will surely
wonder why anyone would imagine that the bridge is worth crossing. So even
if Tribe is right that there are absolutes clashing here, he is wrong to suppose
that he has found a way of softening their conflict.
II
Tribe promises as early as the first chapter to "challenge[] the inevitability
of permanent conflict" and "lay the groundwork for moving on." 9 But before
he can get to his proposed solutions to this seemingly intractable disagreement,
there is, he explains, a bit of underbrush to be cleared away. So he spends a
chapter explaining the Supreme Court's abortion jurisprudence, 0 another on
the history of abortion in America," and a third on, as he puts it, "Locating
Abortion on the World Map."' 2 (This comparative chapter is one of the most
useful in the book, a neat counterpoint to the easy assumption of many Ameri-
cans that both the problems that we face and the solutions that we propose are
somehow sui generis.) These background chapters are intended to provide a
context for the rest of the book and also, particularly the chapter on the Su-
preme Court, to guide lay readers who might be unfamiliar with the relevant
legal terrain, and each is a very interesting catalogue in its own right.
8. P. 6.
9. P. 7.
10. Pp. 10-26. Much of the chapter is devoted to a discussion of Court personnel and their stances on






Even in these early background chapters, however, one sees evidence of the
phenomenon that I suggested before, the tendency of the pro-choice perspective
to dominate a book that strives to be even-handed. A single striking example
will suffice to make the point. In rejecting Mary Ann Glendon's argument that
the United States should follow the example of European countries and use the
teaching authority of law to celebrate life by urging women not to have abor-
tions (for instance through mandatory counseling) but nevertheless allowing
them the ultimate choice, 3 Tribe tells us that these laws would not work in
American society because they provide only unenforceable norms of behavior
rather than enforceable rules:
Law, of course, can be as important for the message it sends as for
the rules it promulgates. Society may benefit from the incorporation in
its laws of normative statements of principle. Yet the codification of a
truly empty promise, one whose vision is belied by the people's day-to-
day experience, one that is utterly at variance with the substance of the
law in which it is contained, can take an unacceptably high toll on
confidence in the rule of law and in the integrity of the legal system as
a whole. The French solution, within an Anglo-American legal system
that has long insisted that law be composed of enforceable norms,
seems to teach mostly hypocrisy."4
As far as it goes, the argument is certainly true: it is possible to design legisla-
tive schemes that change nothing but appear to change much. But this cannot
be a serious objection to requiring counseling and other means of persuasion.
Surely Tribe does not mean to suggest that when pro-life forces argue that the
state should discourage abortions, they are asking the impossible, and they must
therefore be prevented from succeeding for their own sake, lest they lose
respect for law. The stronger argument, one assumes, is that government
persuasion should be prohibited because it intimidates pregnant women and
interferes with their choice, not because it doesn't work!1 5
Still, it must be said that the argument against importing the various Europe-
an experiments is only a very small point and not one of Tribe's principal
themes. In these introductory chapters, his only aim is to establish a series of
starting points: abortion is largely back with the legislatures, the problem has
been around for centuries, and it is a problem everywhere in the world. This
is the ideal time, he seems to think, to search for a resolution that rests on the
13. M. GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WEsTERN LAW (1987).
14. Pp. 73-74.
15. The Supreme Court has rejected some efforts at requiring counseling. See City of Akron v. Akron
Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983). As a constitutional matter, however, the claim
that the state cannot seek to influence the choice of the pregnant woman is much weakened by the abortion
funding cases, Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977), and Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980), and, more
recently, by Rust v. Sullivan, Il1 S. Ct. 1759 (1991). For a forceful statement of the argument that the
funding decisions are flatly inconsistent with Roe, see Perry, Why the Supreme Court Was Plainly Wrong
in the Hyde Amendment Case: A Brief Comment on Harris v. McRae, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1113, 1126 (1980).
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commonalities between the two sides rather than their differences. I can scarce-
ly fault Tribe for arguing that the time to act, if there is action to be taken, is
now. I am confident, however, that despite the fierceness of our moral battle,
future generations, whatever their judgment on the right answer, will shake their
heads disdainfully when they reflect on our struggle over the abortion question.
They will laugh not because they will not believe in grappling seriously with
difficult dilemmas, but because the time will come when a consensus exists that
is far stronger than the weak and shifting survey results that one sees today.
III
Today's debate over abortion, like so many arguments over what might
seem facially to be moral questions, is governed by an imposed consensus: the
right to choose whether to end a pregnancy is fundamental because the Supreme
Court has said it is, and, one supposes, it will cease to be fundamental in the
constitutional sense if a future Supreme Court changes its mind. This, I think,
is what was really at stake in the battle over Robert Bork's nomination to the
Supreme Court (a battle that Tribe, unlike some other opponents, fought with
considerable integrity, and continues to fight in this book). 6 The Block Bork
Coalition, to be sure, comprised an impressive range of civil rights and civil
liberties organizations, but Justices whose views the groups opposed were
confirmed in the past, even though some of them might have harbored constitu-
tional visions equally objectionable to the Coalition. Most of the gains that the
Coalition described as threatened were not, because no other Justice shared the
views of, say, the public accommodations section of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 that Bork was said to hold. The only significant issue on which it could
be argued in a serious way that a Justice Bork would probably "tip the balance"
was abortion, for Bork would be joining a Court on which it was widely
suspected that there were already four votes to overturn Roe.
Tribe, very much recognizing that Roe even now hangs in the balance,
therefore sets about shoring up its constitutional foundations. The immediate
difficulty that he faces is that the opponents of abortion have successfully
reduced their legal position to what is almost an applause line: the right to end
a pregnancy is not mentioned in the Constitution; it is a right invented by the
courts.
This particular argument against Roe is simplistic in its misunderstanding
not of constitutional theory but of judicial process, and few sophisticated
16. For Tribe's continuing effort to justify the result in the Bork brouhaha, see pp. 18-19. For my
commentary on instances in which Bork's other opponents went a bit overboard, see Carter, Bork Redux,
or How the Tempting of America Led the People to Rise and BattleforJustice, 69 TEX. L. REv. 759 (1991).
For a general statement of Tribe's strong view (one that I dispute) that the Senate has the right and even
the duty to consider the judicial philosophy of nominees to the Supreme Court, see L. TRIBE, GOD SAVE
THIs HONORABLE COURT (1985). I reject this position in Carter, The Confirmation Mess, 101 HARV. L.
REv. 1185 (1988).
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constitutional scholars take it seriously as it stands. Because he is writing for
a lay audience, however, Tribe, who is a very sophisticated scholar, does take
the time to treat it seriously, although it must be said that he has little trouble
in refuting it. Still, the argument that he presents in response lacks a crucial
step. Tribe first explains how it is that the courts use the due process clause
to protect some rights that do not appear in the Constitution in so many
words. 17 He runs into difficulty, however, when he seeks to link the result in
Roe to the Court's established jurisprudence on the right of privacy-the same
difficulty, to be sure, that confronted Justice Blackmun in the majority opinion
in Roe.
John Hart Ely, mere months after Roe was decided, was out with a rather
fierce article contending that the trouble with the decision was not that it was
bad constitutional law, but that it was not constitutional law and gave "almost
no sense of an obligation to try to be."'1 8 Although he does not cite the Ely
essay itself, Tribe chooses this as the essential form of argument that he must
refute; Roe, he wants to show, not only is constitutional law but is good
constitutional law. But it is here that Tribe, like so many pro-choice scholars
who choose to defend Roe as it stands rather than on some other ground, begins
to run into more serious difficulty. Perhaps the transformation of privacy in the
way that the Court has traditionally meant it to privacy in the sense that is
needed to encompass the decision whether to end a pregnancy is not as easy
as it might appear.
Roe v. Wade, Tribe insists, is the logical outgrowth of the Court's privacy
decisions. In order to make this work, however, he must first put the right spin
on the privacy jurisprudence. Thus, for example, Griswold v. Connecticut,
19
in which the Court for the first time restricted the authority of the state to
prohibit contraceptive use (at least by married couples) becomes a case about
protection of "the right to engage in sexual intercourse without having a
child."20 Tribe does not quote Griswold itself for this proposition, nor could
he, since no such notion is discussed in the case. One may make what one likes
of the majority opinion in Griswold, but what concerned the Court was the fact
that the law could be enforced only by sexual legitimacy police invading "the
sacred precincts of marital bedrooms."'" Griswold was a case about privacy
in the strictest sense: when one is on one's own and away from public scrutiny,
the government mustn't snoop, least of all when one is engaged in sex.
Griswold is about the sexual act, not about the result of that act, and certainly
not about medical procedures, a realm in which the state had not theretofore
been thought forbidden to regulate. The logical corollary of Griswold is not
17. Pp. 77-92.
18. Ely, The Wages of Crying Wof: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.L 920, 947 (1973).
19. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
20. P. 94.
21. 381 U.S. at 485.
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reproductive freedom of choice for pregnant women, but complete sexual
freedom of choice for consenting adults; which is another way of saying that
as long as Griswold is the law of the land, it is difficult to defend the result
in Bowers v. Hardwick.
22
Perhaps Roe can be modeled in this traditional sense of privacy, too, as long
as one does not find that the interjection of a physician (which states may
constitutionally require) makes things different. But this has never been the
strongest principle available to justify the result. Surely the pro-choice advocate
can better defend Roe on the model of equality, writing privacy out of the case
altogether and challenging abortion restrictions as sex discrimination.U3 (Tribe
acknowledges this possibility and seems to find it compelling, but he spends
only a page on it,' which is quite a sensible choice, given his principal mis-
sion of exegesis rather than invention of new arguments.) One can go further
and argue, again in equality terms, that reproductive freedom is required to
avoid the subordination of women. My point here is not to determine whether
these arguments are convincing or not, but simply to propose that they are more
compelling than the privacy rationale on which Roe currently rests. The one
thing that cannot be done is to argue that Roe follows from Griswold in some
a fortiori sense.
It is possible, however, to work matters the other way around, to reinvent
abortion as being about sex rather than reinventing the privacy cases as being
about reproduction. In fact, by thinking of the abortion debate as an argument
about sex, Catharine MacKinnon has developed an intriguing explanation for
polling data suggesting that men often are more supportive than women of
broad abortion rights.' MacKinnon, who readily admits that for many well-
meaning people, men and women alike, abortion poses a difficult dilemma,
focuses on the other side of the matter: not why some surveys show fewer
women than men supporting broad abortion rights, but why the surveys show
more men than women supporting them, a subtle and important inversion.
Mackinnon wants to know why, in a world characterized by patriarchy, so
many men would be in favor of something that seems to provide women with
additional freedom. The reason, MacKinnon suggests, is that when men domi-
nate, abortion is not a freedom. Men, she says, support reproductive "freedom"
for their own benefit: the widespread availability of abortion, she argues,
22. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). For a somewhat longer version of my argument that Griswold entails freedom
to choose one's sexual partner far more directly than it entails freedom to choose whether to end a
pregnancy, see Carter, The Inaugural Development Fund Lectures: Scientific Liberalism, Scientistic Law,
69 OR. L. REV. 471, 483-84 (1990).
23. For provocative efforts to defend abortion on equality and other grounds apart from privacy, see,
for example, C. MACKINNON, Privacy . Equality: Beyond Roe r. Wade, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED:
DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 93 (1987), Regan, Rewriting Roe v. Wade, 77 MICH L. REV. 1569 (1979);
Thomson, A Defense of Abortion, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRs 47 (1971).
24. P. 105.
25. See MacKinnon, The Male Ideology of Privacy: A Feminist Perspective on the Right to Abortion,
RADICAL AMERICA July-Aug. 1983, at 23.
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translates into a widespread heterosexual availability of women. If an unexpect-
ed pregnancy can be ended in an instant, there is still less reason (there was
never much, she seems to say) for men to be responsible, or even kind, in their
selection of sexual partners.
I think that MacKinnon, too, might be oversimplifying a complex psycholo-
gy, but her view has a certain appeal. She articulates what is often unspoken
in the abortion debate. We may frame the debate as being about privacy, or
about control of one's reproductive processes, or about equality, or about much
else besides; but for MacKinnon, the argument is really about sex. The smaller
the number of legal roadblocks to abortion, the fewer the practical barriers to
heterosexual intercourse.
When one moves MacKinnon's analysis onto the constitutional plane,
however, one has to wonder which way it cuts. After all, if the widespread
availability of abortion makes it harder rather than easier for women to with-
stand the predatory conduct of men, then Roe is about sexual privacy only in
a special sense: it is about the privacy of men who are being oppressive rather
than the privacy of women who are being oppressed. This is, it seems, another
of those intriguing areas (the prohibition of exploitative pornography is another)
in which the feminist left meets the traditionalist right, for many women in the
pro-life movement have very strong views about the proper conditions for sex,
and when they counsel women to avoid sex outside of marriage, they are
expressing well-known concerns that men who have no fears about fatherhood
will "take advantage" of women whom they no longer have any reason to
respect. This language is all very old-fashioned and it harks back to a world
that was more oppressive of women than this one, but there is still an intriguing
point, one that dovetails with MacKinnon's analysis: a principal consequence
of abortion rights is that they make sex harder for women to avoid, which in
a patriarchal society potentially degrades women by increasing the likelihood
of sexual exploitation. One may accept this argument or reject it; my reason
for mentioning it is simply to suggest that the coin of privacy has more than
one side.
IV
There is a second and more troubling difficulty with Tribe's constitutional
discussion, one with eerie but clear echoes of the battle to keep Robert Bork
off the Supreme Court. I suppose one might refer to it as the Myth of the
Disinterested Expert, and Tribe exemplifies it in this startling passage:
What may surprise some, given the certitude with which Judge Bork
and a number of others pronounce that Roe v. Wade was constitutionally
illegitimate, is how many lawyers and law professors throughout the
country believe the Supreme Court's decision in that case was entirely
correct as a legal matter. For example, a friend of the court brief was
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filed in the Webster case "on behalf of 885 American law professors
... who believe that the right of a woman to choose whether or not to
bear a child, as delineated... in Roe v. Wade, is an essential compo-
nent of constitutional liberty and privacy commanding reaffirmation by
[the Supreme] Court." Similarly, the American Bar Association in
February 1990 approved a resolution expressing the ABA's recognition
that "the fundamental rights of privacy and equality guaranteed by the
United States Constitution" encompass "the decision to terminate [a]
pregnancy."
Now, of course, nearly a thousand law professors and the nation's
leading organization of lawyers could certainly be wrong on a matter
of law. But how plausible is it that all of them would fail to recognize
as blatant a legal blunder as some say the Court made in Roe?26
What is one to make of this? Does Tribe seriously suggest that the nation's law
professors are so apolitical that they would prefer identifying a "blatant...
legal blunder" to making a political point? Maybe he is right, and I would like
to think so, but there has been nothing in recent history, or past history either,
to suggest that he is; law professors have to work as hard as anybody else to
separate their personal moral convictions from their conclusions on what the
Constitution requires or permits or forbids, and nowadays this separation is
thought by many to be impossible or wrong. As to the ABA, it has recently
repealed the controversial 1990 resolution of which Tribe makes so much.
Maybe "the nation's leading organization of lawyers" has changed its mind
about the law: does this imply that the rest of us should too? One might
respond, of course, that only politics led to the repealer, and one would un-
doubtedly be right; but if the ABA is so susceptible to political pressure to find
other than the "correct" legal answer, then why assume that the initial pro-
choice resolution amounts to anything other than politics? In fact, why give
special weight to the organization's views at all?
My point is not that Tribe is wrong or that these groups are. My point,
rather, is that in a book written for the lay public, it is important not to make
too much of the positions taken by professional organizations. In particular, it
is potentially misleading to suggest that their members are making disinterested,
dispassionate judgments about law. Besides, even if they are as distant and
objective as Tribe implies, the majority sentiment among "experts" is surely
irrelevant. In determining constitutional meaning or learning whether a consti-
tutional mistake has been made, the last thing that it seems sensible to do is
count heads, even if they are the heads of smart law professors and smart
lawyers. If that is the ideal guide to whether the courts have made a mistake
or not, then there is scarcely any need for judges.
26. Pp. 82-83 (ellipsis and brackets in original) (footnotes omitted).
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V
A principal weapon in the pro-life arsenal is exactly what the movement's
name implies: the argument that the fetus is a person. This argument has
important political consequences, because in a world in which much regulation
of abortion has been returned to the legislatures, it will obviously be easier for
pro-life forces to enact abortion restrictions if they can convince legislators (and
the public) of the personhood of the fetus. The question that Tribe poses,
however, is whether fetal personhood possesses any legal significance.27
The first point that should be made is that there is a broad consensus among
legal scholars, whether pro-life or pro-choice, that the state lacks the power to
define personhood when its definition would interfere with the exercise of the
constitutional right to terminate a pregnancy. 8 I am not sure that the matter
is quite as clear as this consensus might imply,29 but the argument is certainly
a plausible and straightforward one: if the state cannot prohibit abortion, then
it cannot use a subterfuge to reach the same goal.
Still, this proposition has the practical effect of putting the entire abortion
debate off limits; as is so common in American political dialogue, it allows one
side to say to the other that there is no need for moral debate because the rights
that are at stake are of constitutional dimension. But there is no reason that
27. Tribe's discussion of the problem of personhood is refreshingly free of any'suggestion that the
religious motivation of many pro-life advocates rules their positions out of bounds, either as a matter of
constitutional law or as a matterof secular liberal dialogue: "[A] question such as this, having an irreducibly
moral dimension, cannot properly be kept out of the political realm merely because many religions and
organized religious groups inevitably take strong positions on it." P. 116.
This is a point worth stressing. Many in the pro-choice movement have evidenced an unfortunate
tendency to denigrate religious motivation, as though the fact that the moral positions of many in the pro-life
movement are fired by spiritual commitment is itself an index of illegitimacy. Political rhetoric, letters to
the editor, even law review articles by scholars who should know better, have all advocated what amounts
to a ban on participation in these debates by people whose morality is shaped by religious conviction. Tribe
quite poignantly admits that this was once his own view. P. 252 n.3. Even one Justice of the Supreme Court
has suggested that the definition of personhood is inherently religious and therefore not the state's business.
See Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490, 571 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
There is much tragedy in this tendency. The American political tradition is full of religious activism,
much of it in the service of expressly liberal ends. There was no demand for the separation of church and
state during the civil rights movement, which was sparked by open and explicit calls upon religious belief,
and it is an ahistorical fantasy to imagine that the religious aspect was mere window dressing. Moreover,
no one seems to consider the problem irreducibly religious when the state defines personhood for other
purposes, such as inheritance, murder, or the abolition of slavery.
28. See, e.g., Cox, Congress v. The Supreme Court, 33 MERCER L. REV. 707, 711 (1982); Emerson,
The Power of Congress to Change Constitutional Decisions of the Supreme Court: The Human Life Bill,
77 Nw. U. L. REV. 129 (1982); Estreicher, Congressional Power and Constitutional Rights: Reflections on
Proposed "Human Life" Legislation, 68 VA. L. REV. 333 (1982). All of these articles were written in
response to the movement to enact a "Human Life Bill" as an effort to reverse or at least undermine Roe
v. Wade, an effort that was sparked by Stephen Galebach. See Galebach, A Human Life Statute, 7 HUMAN
LIFE REV. 3 (1981).
29. See Carter, The Morgan "Power" and the Forced Reconsideration of Constitutional Decisions, 53
U. CHI. L. REV. 819 (1986).
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elevating a moral claim to constitutional status should put an end to public
moral conversation.
The task of defining personhood is necessarily of vital importance to the
liberal state, for, under liberalism, rights attach to sovereign individuals. Not
all persons are treated the same, of course-17-year-olds cannot vote, 18-year-
olds can-but distinctions among persons are no longer supposed to be signs
of their differing worth. The state determines when a being is a person for the
purposes of murder, inheritance, taxes, tort, and much more (including the
prohibition on slavery). In fact, the state can scarcely regulate without some
understanding, whether explicit or not, of what constitutes a "person."
The state's power to define personhood is denied only when one has an ex
ante preference that a particular thing be defined as something other than a
person. Thus, the reason that the state is prohibited from defining the fetus as
a person is that allowing the state to do so is seen as complicating the case for
making abortion widely available. One cannot find another sensible reason. It
cannot be, as Justice Blackmun's majority opinion in Roe suggests, that the
reason the state cannot define the fetus as a person is that there has never been
societal consensus on its personhood,30 for there is no principle of law forbid-
ding difficult legislative choices in the absence of consensus; if there were,
federally mandated affirmative action, to take only one of many sensitive
subjects, would not exist. Nor can the reason be, as some theorists have sug-
gested, that science itself is unable to supply the answer, for were legislation
forbidden in the absence of scientific consensus, it would be constitutionally
impermissible to fund the Strategic Defense Initiative.
Consequently, the only "reason" that the state is not allowed to define the
fetus as a juridical person is that the right to abortion exists. This might seem
like a case of the tail wagging the dog, but it reflects a legitimate fear that the
case for killing a person is weaker than the case for allowing a woman to
choose freely whether to bear a fetus that might become one. For all the
argument over personhood, however, it is not clear that it possesses either the
political or the constitutional significance that is claimed for it.
Opinion surveys consistently show a majority of Americans (actually, a
majority of white Americans) opposed to overturning Roe v. Wade, but some
surveys also show a necessarily overlapping majority believing that the termina-
tion of a pregnancy is the equivalent of killing a child.3' Plainly, this is one
area in which a survey is just words: the group that is in both majorities is
unlikely truly to believe that ending a pregnancy is like killing a child or it
30. 410 U.S. at 156-57.
31. The figures on overlapping majorities are drawn from a 1986 CBS News/New York Times poll.
N.Y. Times, Feb. 23, 1986, at 22E. For recent evidence of general public support for Roe, see G. GALLUP,
THE GALLUP POLL: PUBLIC OPINION 1989, at 20-22, 160-64 (1990). For evidence of the discrepancy
between white and black Americans on the issue of abortion, see, for example, NATIONAL RESEARCH
COUNCIL, A COMMON DESTINY: BLACKS AND AMERICAN SOCIETY 215 (1989).
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would likely oppose Roe. What the survey is really detecting, one supposes,
is a majority sense that the fetus represents a form of life the destruction of
which makes many people uncomfortable. But many of those who are uncom-
fortable are not so uncomfortable that they want to turn their discomfort into
positive law. According to the surveys, they still believe that abortion is
sometimes the best way out of a difficult situation and that the choice should
be left to the pregnant woman; most Americans, although they might be willing
to limit the grounds on which an abortion might be sought, are unwilling to
take the ultimate decision out of the private sphere. Although the results of
surveys on this issue are volatile and widely regarded as suspect, it is at least
possible that a politician could survive-cf. Mario Cuomo-while holding
simultaneously the views that a fetus is a person and that abortion should
remain an unfettered personal choice. So the absolute political significance of
personhood may be small.
Nor is it at all clear that fetal personhood possesses the constitutional
significance ordinarily claimed for it; indeed, the success of the pro-life move-
ment in holding that personhood is an important constitutional question, while
perhaps invited by the structure of the majority opinion in Roe,32 has always
been something of a puzzle. Even Tribe seems to be taken in by the peculiar
pro-life canard holding that were the fetus deemed a juridical person within the
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, a state law permitting abortions would
violate the Constitution. Says Tribe:
Notice that this is not really an argument in support of a state's power
to go either way on the subject of abortion. For under this argument for
fetal rights, if a state legislature permits abortion, it is licensing others
to deprive the fetus of life without due process of law and is denying
to the fetus the equal protection of the state's murder laws, in a blatant
violation of the Constitution's ban on all such denials. 33
In this, Tribe is simply echoing the majority opinion in Roe v. Wade, wherein
Justice Blackmun wrote: "If this suggestion of personhood is established, the
appellant's case, of course, collapses, for the fetus' right to life would then be
guaranteed specifically by the [Fourteenth] Amendment. '34 This notion that
the equal protection clause or the due process clause by their own force would
prohibit the state from allowing the killing of persons within its jurisdiction
forms the basis for the so-called Human Life Bill that was once a central part
of the anti-Roe strategy; but as a legal principle, it is just as wrong as it can
be.
32. See Carter, supra note 29, at 837-40.
33. P. 115 (emphasis in original).
34. 410 U.S. at 156-57.
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Piling irony upon irony, it is Robert Bork, who has heaped such vehement
contempt upon Roe v. Wade, who pointed out the error in the course of his
testimony against the Human Life Bill. (In the frequently ugly campaign to
defeat Bork's nomination to the Supreme Court, some Over-eager researcher
informed the opponents that Bork had testified in favor of the bill-an error
that, like so many other misstatements in our one-liner political world, was
accepted and reported without a shred of evidence.)35 In his testimony, Bork
pointed out that the Supreme Court indulges in balancing tests all the time, and
that once a right of privacy is accepted, there is nothing on the face of the
Fourteenth Amendment to indicate why that right must always be trumped by
the rights of the fetal person. On the contrary, said Bork, a court could perfectly
well accept the fetus as a juridical person and yet deny that the Constitution
itself requires the pregnant woman to carry it to term; indeed, he said, we could
end up with a "common law of abortion" that would look very much like what
the Justices announced in Roe.36
There is another reason, too, that the status of the fetus as juridical person
would not by its own force end the constitutional argument over abortion. The
fact that you the reader and I the writer are juridical persons does not lead to
any conclusions whatsoever about the constitutional status of the state's crimi-
nal law of murder. The fact that we are persons does not mean that some
optimal murder statute is constitutionally required, and the degrees of protection
(if one considers both degree of punishment and likelihood of its imposition)
vary widely from state to state. Nor does the equal protection clause require
that all murders be treated the same. Many states punish the killing of peace
officers in performance of their duties more severely than other killings; I see
nothing in our constitutional doctrine as it now stands to prevent the state from
punishing more or less severely the killing of a reader or a writer, for neither
involves a suspect classification. So unless one is prepared to make a case for
the suspectness of classifications turning on whether the "person" has yet been
born, a court might well sustain the state's decision to punish less severely (or
not at all) the killing of a fetus-particularly, as Bork pointed out, when there
are competing interests at stake.
VI
There is a further pro-choice argument for the irrelevance of fetal
personhood. Even if the fetus is a human person in every relevant respect,
conscripting women to carry fetuses of which they would rather be free is said
to be a form of slavery. That is not a bad argument, especially when paired
35. On the false report that Bork supported the Human Life Bill, see R. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF
AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 289-90 (1990).
36. See The Human Life Bill: Hearings on S. 158 Before the Subcommittee on Separation of Powers
of the Senate Judiciary Committee, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 308-16 (1982) (statement of Robert Bork).
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with the equality concern that, whether the possibility of pregnancy is a biologi-
cal accident or not, the state makes no similar effort to conscript men to support
living things that they would rather not (although males who were Vietnam-era
military draftees might have disputed this point). Whether one finally finds that
argument persuasive or not, however, I am interested in turning it on its head
and pursuing the moderately less familiar but still common pro-life argument
that the dehumanizing of the fetus is like the dehumanizing of the slave. Tribe
uses a form of this analogy to reject the claim that the value of fetal life is only
what people in power make it: "The same thing once was said of slaves," says
Tribe. "[T]he value of black Americans was less than the value of white
Americans in the view of people with power.-
37
True, but too soft. In the view of many people with power, the slaves were
a sub-species, not fully human, which justified their masters in holding them
in thrall and making all decisions for them. Self-described pro-life feminists
(some say this is an oxymoron, but that is a semantical quibble that I would
rather not pursue) argue that the situation of the fetus in society is much like
the situation of women historically: without power or choice, totally subject to
the whim of the owner.38 The further, and perhaps stronger, analogy to slavery
is obvious.
So is the refutation, one might suppose. Whatever our views about the fetus,
we know that the woman, and the slave, are fully human. The reason we know
is that, for the sake of our argument, we have defined things that way. After
all, the slaveholder might say that he should be free to decide whether his slave,
his property, is human, for the due process clause guarantees property in terms
just as strong as those protecting liberty. Indeed, if not for the trifling matter
of the Thirteenth Amendment, the slaveholder might say that if Roe v. Wade
is correct, then ipso facto his rights must be protected too.
As a moral matter, one might draw a distinction between the woman making
a choice about something intrinsic to her body and the slaveholder making a
choice about something extrinsic to his body. The slaveholder might respond
that control of the slave is every bit as vital to his well-being as control of her
body is to the woman. The easy rejoinder is that the slaveholder's control is
over another human being, but that simply returns the argument to its begin-
ning: we have not yet explained why the state should be able to override the
slaveholder's claim that what he is enslaving is not human.
A better candidate for distinguishing the cases would note the difference
in what the two protesters, the slaveholder and the pregnant woman, are trying
to accomplish. Here the conscription argument for reproductive freedom might
be brought into play. The slaveholder wants to control what the state seeks to
liberate, whereas the woman seeks to rid herself of what the state seeks to force
37. P. 119.
38. See Callahan, The Impact of Religious Beliefs on Attitudes Toward Abortion, in DEFINING HUMAN
LIFE 279 (M. Shaw & A. Doudera, eds. 1983).
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her to keep; without regard to the humanity of the object, then, one seeks
control of what the state wishes to make free, while the other seeks freedom
from that which the state wishes to make her control. The distinction, then,
turns not at all on the question of who has the right to determine personhood,
and much more on the liberal bias toward freedom rather than control; so that
even if the fetus and the slave are both human, the result that slavery is prohib-
ited and abortion is allowed is both coherent and consistent.
VII
But that does not make it right. Pro-life forces are not interested in clever
scholarly arguments; they are interested in saving the lives of what they insist
are human beings. The true climax of Tribe's book arrives in his effort to solve
the problem posed by his title, by "explor[ing] the grounds for a political
compromise other than the one reached in Roe itself."' 9 He first runs through
a series of what he calls "cruel" compromises: imposing consent requirements,
mandating notification (for example, of parents in the case of a minor), dictat-
ing waiting periods, allowing abortions only for specified reasons, limiting the
use of public funds for abortions, restricting the activities of clinics, and altering
Roe's cut-off dates.
Tribe has two principal objections to these "compromises." The first is that
they don't work; that is, according to Tribe, "they don't even serve the purpose
of decreasing the number of abortions."4 I am not sure that his statistics are
convincing, but let us assume that he is right. What is more intriguing is his
second, more central objection: the various "compromises," he says, are "cru-
el"--cruel, he means, to the pregnant women whose privacy rights are implicat-
ed:
The overarching problem with all these purported compromises is that
they are not compromises at all. Many of the laws put forward to stake
out what is supposedly a middle ground in the abortion debate, rather
than meaningfully protecting either life or choice, randomly frustrate
both and do not move us closer to a society of caring, responsible
people.
In the case of any given woman, these laws will either act as an
absolute obstacle to abortion or will not stand in the way.... [I]t seems
obvious that most of these solutions are unsatisfactory in that they
promise abortion rights in principle but deny them in practice to those
who are least able to bear the burden of motherhood-particularly the
young, the uneducated, the rural, and the nonwhite."
39. P. 197 (emphasis in original).
40. P. 209.
41. Pp. 208-09. For a similar analysis of abortion "compromises," see Dellinger, supra note 6.
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But that line of argument, while perhaps sensible as a matter of constitutional
theory, is unlikely to appeal to one whose starting premise is not the need to
safeguard reproductive autonomy or individual privacy, but the desire to protect
fetal life. To the pro-life advocate, the compromises would seem equally cruel,
but for a different reason: the cruelty would be to the fetuses, the real or
potential humans, whose lives the compromises would snuff out. For just as
the pro-choice advocate would note that the compromises still interfere with
privacy or autonomy, the pro-life advocate would note that they still allow the
destruction of some fetuses.
Unless one begins with a bias, either pro-choice or pro-life, one cannot say
which cruelty is the greater. Tribe's examples really serve as evidence that
compromise in the sense of agreement might be impossible; indeed, Tribe's
own pro-choice biases are surely at work in his ultimate decision to reject
cruelty to women in favor of cruelty to fetuses. The choice that he makes is
moral and principled and might even be the one that most people in our society
would prefer, at least as a matter of law (although this is not as clear as one
might think); but there is no particular reason that others, whose moral starting
points are very different from Tribe's, should find his argument persuasive.
And that, perhaps, is the difficulty. Tribe's title tells the story of his book,
and of this critique: much of the debate over abortion does represent a clash
of absolutes, and not only are they absolutes-they are axioms. Putting to one
side the millions of Americans whose views are reflected in opinion surveys,
most of whom clearly find this issue a tough one, there are at the core of both
the pro-choice and pro-life movements people sufficiently sure of their starting
points that conversation with others whose axioms differ is virtually impossible.
To speak of dialogue is to talk past both groups. The argument, finally, is about
power. The only issue is who wins.
VIII
Still, Tribe has answers, and some of them are quite sensible. He suggests,
for example, that cheap and reliable neonatal care and better and more wide-
spread contraceptive technologies would go a long way toward reducing
reliance on abortion as a means of dealing with unwanted pregnancies. Abortion
is not something that any woman embraces cheerfully; as Adrienne Rich has
written, "No free woman, with 100 percent effective, nonharmful birth control
readily available, would 'choose' abortion."4
But birth control is not all of it. Surely the lodestar of a real solution to the
abortion dilemma should be the proposition that a world in which few women
desire abortions is better than one in which some women desire them but are
unable to attain them. Thus if the pro-life movement wants to reduce the
42. A. RICH, OF VOMAN BORN: MOTHERHOOD AS EXPERIENCE AND INSTITUTION 268-69 (1976).
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number of abortions but is unable to enact legislation that will do very much
to accomplish this goal, it must offer other incentives for women who choose
to carry their pregnancies to term, finding ways to convince others to value life
as much as the movement does. One must deal, after all, with the roots of the
problem, and abortion is more a symptom than a problem; when women seek
abortions, there are reasons that they do. We live in a world where child care
is often shoddy or expensive, where jobs are not put on hold for women (or
for men) who take time off to care for their children, where the very act of
devoting one's life and skills to one's children continues to be viewed with
suspicion.43 Absent a considerable network of legal guarantees-that one's
job will be waiting, that child care will not bust one's budget, and so on-it
will continue to be very difficult for many women who might prefer to make
another choice to carry their pregnancies to term."
And of course, there will always be women whose pregnancies will be
"unwanted" for reasons that the government is powerless to alter: rape, incest,
accidents, family situations, illnesses, birth defects, and so on. These abortion
decisions cannot be reached by a strategy designed to remove the obstacles to
childbearing, for these women are not so much facing obstacles as they are
choosing for themselves which future life's vision they most desire. This is,
perhaps, the essence of a private choice,45 for no one can select a life's vision
for someone else. Whether this is a private choice with which the government
must interfere in order to protect life is a different matter, and it is one that
Tribe, in the last part of his book, seeks to elide by means of a thought experi-
ment involving an artificial womb.46 Tribe suggests that if we had a safe and
reliable means for removing the fetus from the pregnant woman and installing
it in an artificial womb where it could be carried to term, the woman would
suddenly be situated similarly to the man involved in bringing about the
pregnancy: neither would have the fetus within the body.
The troubles with this proposal, even as a thought experiment, are two.
First, the pro-choice advocate might object that it is only the woman, not the
43. See E. Aird, Militant Mothering (work-in-progress on file with author).
44. There is an additional, more controversial strategy. If one truly cares about incentives and cannot
find negative ones, then one must generate positive ones instead. So it may be that what the pro-life
movement should ultimately demand from the government is not prohibition but money, with which women
will be paid for carrying pregnancies to term: for one incentive that has always worked is to offer people
a reward for the behavior that one prefers. This is in two different senses a regressive solution-surely the
women more likely to be attracted by a cash payment for carrying pregnancies to term rather than ending
them will be mostly poor and disproportionately women of color, and it raises the specter not of conscription
but of an all-volunteer army of human incubators-but the same might be said, albeit indirectly, of
proposals, for example, to improve neonatal care and child care. Those are both services that women with
sufficient resources can purchase in the market, so when the government provides them or subsidizes them,
it is doing indirectly what direct payments do directly.
45. See A. ALLEN, UNEASY ACCESS: PRIVACY FOR WOMEN IN A FREE SOCIETY (1988). See also
Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737 (1989).
46. Pp. 220-25. A few years back, I offered a similar idea. See Carter, Roe vs. Wade Left Both Sides
Open to Science, WALL ST. J., Aug. 21, 1985, at 24, col. 4.
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man, who is forced to undergo this invasive surgical procedure. The state might
deem the procedure safe, and so it might be, but the woman's sovereignty over
her own body is still put in question as long as this is the only procedure that
she is permitted to choose. Second, as Tribe himself acknowledges, this form
of compromise might be said to "violate a woman's rights to offer her equality
only by rendering her womanhood inconsequential and marginalizing her
distinctiveness as a woman"--an objection that would also hold, one supposes,
were technology developed to allow impregnation of men-and, further, it
"would vindicate a woman's right to be free of the burden of pregnancy but
not her right to control the use of her genetic material in the creation of a
child."'47
And Tribe's other "humane compromises"--for example, approval of the
so-called abortion pill, RU-486-are unlikely to make the pro-life side happy.
It is true, as Tribe argues, that were abortion a matter of taking the proper
medication rather than undergoing a surgical procedure, the privacy defense that
is under so much fire would be more plausible.48 But the pro-life advocate
would see this technological advance less as a compromise than as a surrender:
the cheaper and easier the technology of abortion, the pro-life argument neces-
sarily runs, the greater the devaluing of the human life that the fetus represents.
Ix
The short of the matter is that, although one side obviously must prevail,
compromise seems unlikely. What, then, are we to do? Tribe offers this guide
to a solution: "In the end, the answer to both sides is the same: In a democracy,
voting and persuasion are all we have."49 The implication is that the two sides
in this battle should be talking to each other rather than at or past each other,
a lovely vision of the role of public moral dialogue in the liberal state.
The trouble is that Tribe has just devoted most of his book to showing us
all of the many forces that make conversation difficult or impossible, and even
when he has suggested common ground, I have tried to show why it is rarely
ground that the pro-life side is likely to find attractive; and the one time that
it might be-in his discussion and apparent advocacy of a technology that
would allow the pregnant woman to end the pregnancy but not kill the fe-
tus-he might run into trouble from the pro-choice side. I fear that his title got
the matter right and the book, for all of its value, has not really resolved it. The
clash is still one of absolutes, and there is no particular reason to think that
dialogue will resolve it in the near term.
That does not mean that no resolution is possible, however, for in the
American constitutional democracy, voting and persuasion are not all we have.
47. Pp. 224-25 (emphasis in original).
48. P. 216.
49. P. 240 (emphasis in original).
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We also have the Constitution. Although Tribe is at pains to point out that the
Constitution can be amended," amendment has lately proved almost impossi-
ble, even for the broadly popular amendment to guarantee equality for women.
When a moral battle seems politically intractable, the parties cease to battle
each other and fight for control of the legal apparatus instead, arguing before
the courts the merits of their moral positions (in legal guise), or, better still,
choosing judges on the basis of predictions about the way that they will vote.
The reason, I suspect, that Webster came as such a stunning setback to both
sides is that neither was well-prepared to cope with a world in which the
political institutions would actually have to resolve a moral dilemma instead
of letting the Supreme Court do it and taking potshots at the results.
Robert Goldwin, in a little essay on the search for morality in the Constitu-
tion, has complained that moral absolutism tends to distort constitutional law.
51
This, of course, is true. But in a world in which moral absolutists, many in
number, are not content with the results of political process, there are few
alternatives to litigation or civil war. We tried civil war once already, and if
hundreds of thousands died, at least the viciously repressive system of chattel
slavery was eradicated. In the abortion debate, the most firmly committed
activists on both sides seem to think that every bit as much is at stake now as
was then, which suggests that until there is some sign of political consensus,
it may turn out that in this democracy, litigation and protest are all we have.
50. P. 240.
51. ROBERT GOLDWIN, Of Men and Angels: A Search for Morality in the Constitution, in WHY BLACKS,
WOMEN, AND JEWS ARE NOT MENTIONED IN THE CONSTITUTION, AND OTHER UNORTHODOX VIEWS 21
(1990).
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Wither Goest Labor Law:
Law and Economics in the Workplace*
Governing the Workplace: The Future of Labor and Employment Law. By Paul
C. Weiler.** Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990.
Michael H. Gottesmant
INTRODUCTION
The long and steady decline in the percentage of private-sector employees
represented by unions-a decline now in its fourth decade'-preoccupies all
thinking about American labor law today. One would not have learned of this
decline from the writings of scholars and courts during the 1960's and 1970's;
indeed, these sources espoused little but unadulterated enthusiasm for the
institution of collective bargaining.2
An entire generation of labor law academics focused their scholarship upon
perfecting the system of collective bargaining created by the Wagner Act3 for
* In the interest of upholding The Yale Law Journal's reputation for editorial reliability, I wish to be
clear that the spelling of "wither" is mine, retained after an editor's query, and that it is intended as a double
pun. The existing scheme for regulating the workplace-that established by the National Labor Relations
Act-is withering away, as reflected by the precipitous decline in the percentage of private-sector employees
who are union represented. See infra notes 1 and 2 and accompanying text. And some scholars advocate
that the future course be reliance on an unregulated market, a total withering away of the law as an
instrument of regulation. See infra notes 23-30 and accompanying text.
** Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.
t Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. I wish to thank Alan Axelrod, Stanley Besen,
Gary Pellet, Warren Schwartz, Mark Tushnet, and participants in a Georgetown Faculty Research Workshop
for enormously helpful reactions to an earlier draft of this review, and Patricia Steele for invaluable research
assistance. The views expressed in this review undoubtedly are informed by-and readers may wonder
whether they are skewed by-my long service in the firm of Bredhoff & Kaiser representing labor unions.
1. The percentage of private-sector employees represented by unions peaked in 1954 (at 38%) and then
began a decline that, by 1990, found less than 14% union represented. Gottesman, Rethinking Labor Law
Preemption: State Laws Facilitating Unionization, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 355, 362 (1990).
2. See, e.g., infra notes 3, 5-8.
3. National Labor Relations Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-198,49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended
at 29 U.S.C. §151-168 (1973 & Supp. 1990)) [hereinafter Wagner Act or NLRAJ. The literature on the
NLRA is vast and rich. The following books and articles are some among the many that are important in
the field: J. ATLESON, VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAW (1983); J. GETMAN, S.
GOLDBERG & J. HERMAN, UNION REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS: LAW AND REALITY (1976); Bok, The
Regulation of Campaign Tactics in Representation Elections Under the National Labor Relations Act, 78
HARV. L. REV. 38 (1964); Cox, The Ditty To Bargain in Good Faith, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1401 (1958); Cox,
Federalism in the Law of Labor Relations, 67 HARV. L. REV. 1297 (1954); Feller, A General Theory of
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ordering the legal relations between employers and employees.4 The courts
were no less rhapsodic; the Supreme Court, for example, repeatedly declared
that collective bargaining is "our national labor policy,"5 and its decisions gave
collective bargaining the fullest possible sway. So powerful was the Court's
commitment that it went to great lengths to prevent interference by federal
courts and state governments with the parties' bargaining freedom6 and even
subordinated the values of other federal statutes, such as Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964,7 to the primacy of collective bargaining.8
the Collective Bargaining Agreement, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 663 (1973); Gorman & Finkin, The Individual and
the Requirement of "Concert" Under the National Labor Relations Act, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 286 (1981);
Gould, The Question of Union Activity on Company Property, 18 VANID. L. REV. 73 (1964); Hyde, Economic
Labor Law v. Political Labor Relations: Dilemmasfor Liberal Legalism, 60 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1981); Lesnick,
The Gravamen of the Secondary Boycott, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 1363 (1962): Summers, Collective Agreements
and the Law of Contracts, 78 YALE L.J. 525 (1969); Wellington, Union Democracy and Fair Represen-
tation: Federal Responsibility in a Federal System, 67 YALE L.J. 1327 (1958). To these should be added,
for reasons that will be apparent later, the prior articles of Paul Weiler diagnosing the defects in the NLRA.
See infra note 143.
4. Under the NLRA, employees have the right to select by majority vote an exclusive bargaining
representative, the employer is obliged to bargain with that representative in a good faith attempt to arrive
at a mutually acceptable'collective bargaining agreement, and employees enjoy a protected right to use
various forms of economic pressure (strikes, picketing, consumer boycotts, etc.) to induce the employer to
accept their representative's bargaining proposals. Under this scheme, government facilitates the creation
and functioning of the bargaining process, but the determination of substantive employment terms is left
entirely to the parties.
5. See, e.g., Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 79 (1977); Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n of
Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132, 136 (1976); Teamsters Union v.
Morton, 377 U.S. 252, 260 (1964); infra notes 6, 8.
6. For restraints on federal courts, see, e.g., United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S.
29 (1987) (except in the most extreme circumstances, courts cannot set aside arbitration awards implement-
ing collective bargaining agreements on ground that they offend public policy); Jacksonville Bulk Terminals,
Inc. v. Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, 457 U.S. 702 (1982) (courts ordinarily may not enjoin strikes even if
they think them in breach of collective bargaining agreement); United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise
Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960) (courts may not refuse to enforce arbitration awards because they
think arbitrators' decisions are wrong on merits; parties chose arbitrators, not courts, to decide merits, and
arbitrators are better qualified to do so); United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960)
(courts may not refuse to order arbitration of grievances alleging breach of collective bargaining agreement
because they think them frivolous; parties have selected arbitrators, not courts, to construe their agreement,
and arbitrators are better qualified to do so).
For restraints on state governments, see, e.g., Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 475
U.S. 608 (1986) (NLRA preempts city's right to deny taxi franchise to company for failing to reach
agreement with union on terms of new collective bargaining agreement); Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n of Machin-
ists, 427 U.S. 132 (NLRA preempts states' rights to regulate concerted slowdowns on the job); Amalgamated
Ass'n of Street Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274 (1971) (NLRA preempts states' right to regulate
union activity causing employer to discharge nonmember); San Diego Building Trade Council v. Garmon,
359 U.S. 236 (1959) (NLRA preempts states' rights to regulate picketing).
7. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253 (1964).
8. See, e.g., Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977) (disparate impact
doctrine of Title VII inapplicable to seniority systems, absent discriminatory intent); California Brewers
Ass'n v. Bryant, 444 U.S. 598, 608 (1980) (rejecting effort to limit Teamsters to certain types of seniority
systems: "Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964 against the backdrop of this Nation's longstanding
labor policy of leaving to the chosen representatives of employers and employees the freedom through
collective bargaining to establish conditions of employment applicable to a particular business or industrial
environment.... It does not behoove a court to second-guess either that process or its products.") United
Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979) (racial quota for admission to training programs, negotiated
between private employer and union, does not constitute race discrimination under Title VII); Trans World
Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S. at 79 (obligation to provide reasonable accommodation to religious objectors
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The only discordant note in this affection for collective bargaining has been
sounded by those for whom the institution was designed-the employees-who
appear no longer to share the enthusiasm of the academic and judicial onlook-
ers.9 At the peak of the Wagner Act's success, nearly 40% of private-sector
employees in America were represented by unions."0 That volume constituted
a critical mass, large enough to put pressure on nonunion employers to match
collectively bargained terms in order to prevent unionization and/or compete
in the marketplace for employees. Collective bargaining set the national stan-
dards that other employers were obliged to follow.
Today, however, the percentage of private-sector workers represented by
unions is less than 14%, below the level that existed in 1935 before passage
of the Wagner Act." Where collective bargaining once set the standards for
other employers, unionized employers now are under pressure to escape collec-
tively bargained terms as they face competition from foreign and non-union
firms enjoying much lower labor costs. "Our national labor policy" is withering
away.
A. Ordering the Workplace: Competing Theories
The plunge in unionism makes this a critical moment in labor law scholar-
ship. There is no longer a consensus regarding the core out of which the whole
of the labor law must be elaborated, namely, the central principle for ordering
the relationship between employer and employee. It is easy enough to identify
the logical contenders: an unregulated marketplace, in which the law treats em-
ployer-employee negotiations no differently from the employer's negotiations
with suppliers of raw materials; a marketplace overlaid with government
conferral of substantive protections upon employees; and some form of collec-
tive dealing by employees with their employers (collective bargaining being the
most familiar but not the only paradigm of this last approach).12 What is only
does not require departure from collectively bargained seniority system: "[c]ollective bargaining ... lies
at the core of our national labor policy, and . . . [wlithout a clear and express indication from Congress,
we cannot agree... that an agreed-upon seniority system must give way when necessary to accommodate
religious observances"); Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Org., 420 U.S. 50, 69
(1975) (minority employees may not engage in concerted activity to alter employer's racial policies in dero-
gation of union's role as exclusive bargaining representative substantive right conferred by Title V11 to be
free of racial discrimination "cannot be pursued at the expense of the orderly collective-bargaining process
contemplated by the NLRA").
9. Of course, most employers were never fans of the NLRA, but their disapproval has not been
perceived as an indication that the law has failed in its essential purpose. It is quite another thing when
worlt-rs abandon the Act.
10. Gottesman, supra note 1.
11. Id.
12. Sunstein, Rights, Minimal Terms and Solidarity: A Comment, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 1041, 1059
(1984). Forms of collective dealing other than traditional collective bargaining are discussed infra notes 170-
03 and accompanying text. There are two other ways in which employees can interact with the governance
of their employer, but neither offers a generally useful solution for ordering the workplace. One is voting
employee representation on the employer's Board of Directors. The desirability of such representation is
1991] 2769
The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 100: 2767
just beginning is a serious debate and dialogue among contemporary labor law
scholars about the relative merits of these options. t3
B. "Governing the Workplace": Paul Weiler's Evaluation of the Competing
Theories for Ordering the Workplace
This context of uncertainty and controversy makes especially timely Paul
Weiler's new book, Governing the Workplace.14 Weiler is one of the most
widely respected contemporary scholars in American labor law."5 His contribu-
tion is especially provocative because it constitutes a systematic effort to
demonstrate that collective bargaining, despite its recent setbacks, truly is the
most effective ordering principle for the workplace, and with proper adjustments
in the legal mechanisms that regulate it and self-restructuring by the labor
movement its centrality might be reestablished.
Weiler develops his thesis out of three broad explorations. 6 First, he asks,
why not allow the "market" to regulate the workplace by treating the sale of
labor in the same manner as the sale of raw materials? 7 Here, Weiler engages
in a debate with Richard Epstein, an ardent champion of the market approach.
hotly debated. See, e.g., Stone, Labor and the Corporate Structure: Changing Conceptions and Emerging
Possibilities, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 73, 157-58 (1988) (workers have greater entitlement than shareholders to
voting Board membership); Williamson, Corporate Governance, 93 YALE L.I 1197, 1206-07 (1984) (at
most, unions should have nonvoting members for purposes of obtaining information). But even were voting
representation provided, it could not suffice to protect employee interests unless employees controlled the
Board. Absent such control, the shareholder majority inevitably would opt for solutions that optimized the
interests of the employer vis---vis the employees. The second alternative is employee control of the gov-
ernance of the corporation, most likely achieved through employee stock ownership plans. It would be
sufficient to point out that employee control is so unlikely to become the predominant mode of corporate
governance that it cannot be looked to as our national solution. But Weiler explores the pros and cons of
employee control, emerging uncertain whether, were it politically viable, it would offer a meaningful alterna-
tive to the approaches described above in text. See P. WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: THE FUTURE
OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW (1990) [hereinafter cited by page number only].
13. Of course, issues of this sort have been generally debated at least since Adam Smith and Karl Marx.
And debates continued in disciplines outside the law schools during the post-World War II period. See, e.g.,
M. FRIEDMAN & R. FRIEDMAN, FREE TO CHOOSE: A PERSONAL STATEMENT 22847 (1979); 0. WILLIAM-
SON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS 57-82 (1975); Alchian &
Demsetz, Production, hformation Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1972). But
the 1980's saw the first signs of interest among contemporary legal scholars.
14. See P. WEILER, supra note 12.
15. Weiler is Canadian, but has been a member of the Harvard Law School faculty for many years
and has written extensively about American labor law. His contributions have been especially enriched, as
has this book, by his knowledge and experience respecting Canadian labor law-under which unions have
fared much better than in the United States. See infra note 142. Weiler was Chair of the British Columbia
Labor Relations Board from 1974 to 1978, has served on the United Auto Workers' Public Review Board
since 1980, and has been an Impartial Umpire to the AFL-CIO since 1987. AALS, DIRECTORY OF LAW
TEACHERS 880-81 (1990).
16. The tripartite structure ascribed to the book in this review is my effort to organize its contents. The
book wanders back and forth among its various theses without a roadmap. For example, the case against
reliance on the marketplace is scattered in three separate chapters, pp. 56-78, 118-33, 134-52. This lack of
cohesion is, I suspect, a bigger problem for reviewers than readers. Weiler's writing style, here as always,
is fluid, and his discussion is interesting throughout.
17. Pp. 56-78, 134-52.
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Epstein contends that the employment relationship is a supply c.ontract like any
other and should be treated as such by the law.18 Weiler, it eventuates, is not
content to trust the market. Second, Weiler asks, why not protect employees
through direct government regulation, rather than leaving them to struggle to
obtain the protections for themselves? He carefully assesses the merits and
demerits of government regulation of employment terms and concludes that the
weaknesses are substantial enough to warrant a search for alternative solu-
tions.' 9 Dissatisfaction with the market and with government regulation leads
Weiler to the final stage, where he tackles a trio of interrelated questions: Is
collective bargaining superior to these other forms of regulating the work-
place?2" If so, why haven't employees embraced it in larger numbers?21 How
(and in what forms) can it be resuscitated?' It is from these inquiries that
Weiler's program for reinstating collective bargaining as the ordering principle
for the American workplace emerges.
There is much that is insightful in this book, and some that is, in my view,
ill-founded. I shall try to convey both qualities in the discussion that follows.
I. WEILER VS. THE MARKET
A. Neoclassical Economics: The Case for Leaving the Labor Market
Unregulated
Weiler's analysis of labor markets responds to a thesis propounded in the
past decade by Richard Epstein and other adherents of neoclassical economics
who contend that there is no reason for the law to treat the sale of labor differ-
ently from the sale of products.' In their view treating the employer-employee
relationship as a typical supply contract respects the autonomy of both parties
and yields outcomes that are efficient. The frequently voiced charge that
workers suffer an "inequality of bargaining power"'24 in dealing with their em-
18. Epstein, A Common Law for Labor Relations: A Critique of the West New Deal Labor Legislation,
92 YALE L.J. 1357 (1983) [hereinafter Epstein, Common Lawl; Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will,
51 U. CHI. L. REV. 947 (1984) [hereinafter Epstein, Contract at Will]; Epstein, Agency Costs. Employment
Contracts and Labor Unions, in PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS 127 (J.W. Pratt
& J.R.J. Zeckhauser eds. 1985). The most extensive elaboration of Epstein's market thesis will appear in
Epstein's forthcoming book, tentatively titled, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAWS chs. 2-5 (forthcoming from Harvard University Press 1991).
19. Pp. 78-87, 152-61.
20. Pp. 87-94, 181-85.
21. Pp. 105-18, 186-93.
22. Pp. 193-311.
23. See Harrison, The "New" Terminable-at-Will Employment Contract: An Interest and Cost Incidence
Analysis, 69 IOWA L. REV. 327 (1984); Power, A Defense of the Employment at Will Rule, 27 ST. LOUIS
U. L.J. 881 (1983); supra note 18. Richard Posner has literally cast his vote in favor of this thesis. Jordan
v. Duff & Phelps, Inc., 815 F.2d 429, 447-50 (7th Cir. 1987) (Posner, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 485 U.S.
91(1988).
24. See, e.g., the NLRA's statement of purpose, 29 U.S.C. §151 (1988) (there is "inequality of bar-
gaining power" between employees and corporate employers; a purpose of NLRA is "restoring equality
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ployers is exaggerated, if not entirely wrong, for employers must compete
against each other to attract workers and thus no employer can succeed unless
it matches the competitive wage.' Any intervention that increases the cost
of labor above that which would be freely negotiated is suboptimal.26 (The
thesis assumes that redistribution of wealth is not a goal we seek to achieve
through our choice of legal regime; Epstein asserts that if we are interested in
redistributing wealth, we can do so more efficiently through the tax and welfare
laws than through the labor laws.)27
B. Neoclassical Economics Applied: Should Discharges Be Regulated?
Epstein puts these arguments to work examining the workplace issue that
has most intrigued academics and courts in the past decade: what legal con-
straints, if any, should be placed upon the employer's ability to discharge its
employees. Epstein notes that at common law the relationship between employ-
er and employee was deemed to be completely contractual, with both sides pre-
sumed to have reserved the right to end the relationship "at will" unless the
contract expressly provided otherwise.28 He recognizes that discharges that
violate public policy-i.e., that offend the interests of strangers to the employ-
ment contract in a way that the law regards as intolerable-are a proper subject
of bargaining power between employers and employees").
25. Epstein, Contract at Will, supra note 18, at 974.
26. Id. at 976. Samuel Issacharoff has succinctly captured the neoclassical view of suboptimality (with
which he disagrees):
[U]nions ... distort both the allocative and distributive functions of an otherwise efficient market.
Unions artificially inflate wages for a privileged sector of the economy at the expense ofconsumer
welfare (including that of the nonunion workforce). By constraining the free functioning of the
employment market, unions also deflect the operation of individual employees' preeminent
protection from oppressive and unjust work conditions: the ability to quit and seek employment
with a rival employer.
Issacharoff, Reconstructing Employment (Book Review), 104 HARV. L. REV. 607, 619 (1990) (reviewing
P. WILER, supra note 12).
27. Epstein, Contract at Will, supra note 18, at 977. Market advocates are divided on the question
whether workers should be allowed to combine to attempt to enhance their market position vis-il-vis the
employer. On the one hand, many libertarians believe that workers should be free to do so, but that the
employer should have no obligation to deal with the combiners and should be free to deal instead with others
who offer to work for less (indeed, free to secure "yellow dog" contracts in which employees bind them-
selves not to join a union.) Epstein, Common Law, supra note 18, at 1369, 1381-85. Utilitarians, on the
other hand, would object that unions represent cartels attempting to fix the price (through control of the
supply) of the commodity they are selling, and that this is just as injurious to society when done with respect
to labor as with respect to other resources upon which the employer must rely. See id. at 1379-8 1. Richard
Posner argues that unions function as traditional cartels. Posner, Some Economics of Labor Law, 51 U. CHiI.
L. REV. 988 (1984). Posner professes not to take a stand on whether that is a good or bad thing: "I take
no position on whether it is socially preferable for the price of labor to be determined on a competitive or
on a cartelized basis." Id. at 990.
Weiler's book analyzes the cartel issue at length, concluding that a union cannot function as an effective
cartel except where the employer's product market is itself already cartelized and in that setting the union's
cartelization is benign as it merely enables the workers to capture some of the rents generated by the existing
employer cartel. Pp. 118-33.
28. Epstein, Contract at Vill, supra note 18, at 947-48.
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of legal regulation.29 For example, an employer may not have committed itself
contractually to abstain from firing employees who refuse to violate the law,
but society has an interest in preventing such discharges. However, when a dis-
charge threatens no interests except those of the discharged employee and its
only supposed vice is that it is somehow unfair to that employee, it is not, in
the absence of a contractual undertaking to refrain from such discharges, a
proper subject for legal intervention.
Epstein assures us that the market will deter most frivolous discharges.
While employers need to be able to rid themselves of bad employees, there are
built-in costs to discharging employees and these will act as natural restraints
upon frivolous discharges: the employer will lose its training investment in the
employee, incur the costs of recruiting and training a replacement, jeopardize
the morale (hence productivity) of the remaining employees, and suffer a
reputational loss that will disadvantage it in competing with other employers
to attract and retain employees.30 We can expect, therefore, that the instances
of frivolous discharge will be relatively infrequent, because they are economi-
cally unsound.
Still, Epstein concedes, there may be some frivolous discharges. But society
would suffer unacceptable costs were we to attempt to prevent or remedy these
through legal intervention. Allowing employees to litigate whether their dis-
charges lack good cause would subject all decisions (not just those that are in
fact frivolous) to second guessing by juries, who may be biased and in any
event may err. Consequently, employers would engage in defensive employment
practices, expending resources to document employee shortcomings in anticipa-
tion of having to defend future discharges or, worse still, retaining unsatisfacto-
ry employees out of fear that justified discharges would be overturned by
juries.3 There would be a dead-weight loss in the efficiency of the enterprise
which would harm society however the loss were distributed.
32
Of course, if an employee really wants this protection against frivolous
discharge, she is free to bargain for it, presumably trading other components
of her wage package for this protection. But, Epstein posits, the almost univer-
sal absence of such contractual protection in the nonunion sector demonstrates
that employees generally do not want this protection, or at least are not willing
to pay for it. He sees this as confirmation of the inadvisability of governmental
interference in the workings of a free market. 33 He suggests that, on balance,
29. Id. at 952.
30. Id. at 966-76.
31. Id. at 970-73.
32. If the cost were reflected in the price of the employer's product, the loss would be suffered by
consumers. If absorbed as lower profits, it would be suffered by shareholders. If recaptured out of the
package of benefits extended generally to employees, the effect of legal protection would not be a net gain
for workers, but rather a redistribution in which the better employees subsidized those at the margin who
are the likely targets of an employer's discharge.
33. Id. at 948, 955.
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employees have preferred ex ante to spare employers the cost of this legal re-
straint and to share in the surplus thus generated.3
4
C. The Liberal Response to the Neoclassical Economists: Ignore or Engage?
When Epstein first unveiled (or, more accurately, reintroduced the legal
fraternity to35) the market thesis for regulating the workplace, Professors Julius
Getman and Thomas Kohler responded:
[P]rofessor Epstein's work does not contribute in any way to our exist-
ing store of knowledge about labor law. It sheds no light on the reality
of labor relations, nor does it contribute anything to our understanding
of the impact of labor law on society .... Professor Epstein's Article
is representative of a growing but lamentable tendency in the legal
literature to comment critically on areas in which the author has no
expertise, using as a measure axioms formulated in vacuo and without
regard to observed actualities.36
If the liberals' only concern were to ward off the prospect that society might
use Epstein's thesis to define the agenda for shaping the labor laws, this
peremptory dismissal likely would suffice. Nothing in contemporary political
experience suggests that the public views the sale of labor as indistinguishable
from the the sale of fish.37 Quite the contrary, the decline in unionization has
been accompanied by an explosion, coming from three directions at once, of
legal rules compelling employers to confer protections and benefits upon em-
ployees: federal legislation, state legislation, and expansion of common law
doctrines by state courts.38
Still, it is important that liberals articulate systematically the deficiencies
they believe inhere in the neoclassical model. For a conviction that workers
cannot be abandoned to an unregulated market is but the start of the venture;
it remains to be determined just what regulation is in order. And prescribing
the right remedy requires accurate diagnosis of the disease. To that end, it is
important to take up the challenge issued by Epstein, in his rejoinder to Getman
and Kohler:
34. See id. at 956-57.
35. See supra note 13.
36. Getman & Kohler, The Common Law. Labor Law, and Reality: A Response to Professor Epstein,
92 YALE L.J. 1415, 1416 (1983).
37. "The labor market might just be different in important ways from the market for fish." R. SOLOW,
THE LABOR MARKET AS A SOCIAL INSTITUTION 30 (1990), quoted in Finkin, Weiler Governing the
Workplace (Book Review), 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1005 (1991) (reviewing P. WEILER, supra note 12).
38. Gottesman, supra note 1, at 361-74; Summers, Labor Law as the Centutry Turns: A Changing of
the Guard, 67 NEB. L. REV. 7, 11-14 (1988). See generally H. SPECTER & M. FINKIN, 2 INDIVIDUAL
EMPLOYMENT LAW AND LITIGATION 134, 288-90 (1989).
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Reexamination of first principles is always hard, and often unpleasant,
especially if it entails a change in orientation or commitment ....
Yet a closer look at Getman and Kohler's own work should be
sufficient to dissipate any complacent support for the status quo. It
should be apparent that Getman and Kohler present no hint of any
theory, normative or positive, relevant to labor relations, or indeed to
any other legal area. Nonetheless it takes a theory to beat a theory, so
it is wholly insufficient for them to belittle the use of common law
[market] arguments without some explanation as to why these arguments
are wrong or why they should be replaced.
39
This is the point at which Paul Weiler enters the debate. Like Getman and
Kohler, he is a true believer in collective bargaining. But he does not follow
the denunciatory course of his predecessors-in-arms. In Weiler's view, Epstein's
argument for leaving the labor market unregulated is a "coherent and powerful
thesis" that should "awaken liberal reformers from a rather dogmatic slum-
ber."' But respect does not connote acceptance. Weiler takes up Epstein's
challenge and attempts to present theories that will beat Epstein's theory.
D. Weiler's Response: Yuppie Justice as the Refutation of the Neoclassical
Economists' Case
Weiler conceptualizes the challenge he is undertaking with this hypothetical:
In some instances, robots have replaced workers in our society. We would not
think to develop a legal regime that intervened to influence the terms that the
robot-seller extracts from the employer or the manner in which the two nego-
tiate over those terms. Why, in the case of work to be done by humans, should
we have a different and more aggressive legal regime for regulating either the
terms upon which such labor will be furnished or the process by which the
parties arrive at those terms?at This is, undoubtedly, the right question, effec-
tively asked, for it forces us to seek out and examine the differences between
contracts for goods and contracts for labor.
Weiler does battle with Epstein over this question largely on Epstein's turf.
At no point does Weiler rest his case on a desire to redistribute wealth from
capitalists to workers; indeed, Weiler apparently believes that such a redistribu-
tion cannot be accomplished through the labor laws except perhaps in cartelized
industries 2 Rather, Weiler's arsenal contains two theories, one "moral" and
one "economic," each asserted to be a sufficient refutation of the propriety of
relying on the market to order labor terms.
39. Epstein, Common Law, Labor Law, and Reality: A Rejoinder to Professors Getman and Kohler,
92 YALE L. 1435 (1983) (emphasis added).
40. P. 63.
41. Pp. 135-36.
42. Pp. 131-33. I discuss the redistribution issue infra notes 96-103 and accompanying text.
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Weiler's theories are quite unlike traditional liberal justifications for
government intervention in that they protect only relatively well-off employees,
more precisely the ones Weiler terms "career employees"--those whose talents
the employer will want to retain throughout their careers.43 Indeed, as we shall
see, Weiler would leave less favored employees defenseless under the law.'*
His book, then, is the ultimate brief for yuppie justice-a legal regime that
protects only skilled, well-educated employees.45
Weiler's first theory declares that many employees have been induced to
stay with their employer through the latter's adoption of employment terms that
create an expectation of career employment, and it is not "moral" to permit the
employer to frustrate that expectation without good justification.46 The second
theory asserts that these career employees have become so dependent upon the
employer-whose largesse would not be replicated were these employees to
seek other jobs available in the market-that they lack the modicum of bar-
gaining leverage necessary to produce an economically efficient agreement.
47
I shall describe Weiler's vision of the career employee, which is common to
both theories, and then examine the theories themselves.
1. The Emergence of the Career Employee
Weiler begins by cataloguing characteristics that distinguish the relationship
of a long-term employee with her employer from that of the raw materials
supplier (the robot-seller in Weiler's conceptual hypothetical). First, the employ-
ee will spend her work-life under the employer's supervision and control; the
robot-seller will not. This means that the employee must subjugate her autono-
my to the dominion of another. It also means that the workplace will represent
the environment in which she spends a substantial part of her life and in which
she will develop friendships and a way of life that will be important to her.
Thus, the rules and practices of that workplace-including the ability to remain
there-will be of paramount concern to the employee, but not, presumably, to
the robot, and surely not to the robot-seller. Second, the robot-seller can
diversify his risk, selling robots to many customers at once; the employee,
however, cannot be two places at once and thus inevitably makes a greater
commitment to the enterprise. Third, once the robot has been sold, the robot-
seller is indifferent to its treatment by the employer; if the employer breaks it,
that is a problem for the employer alone. But when an employer "breaks" an
43. See infra notes 49-56 and accompanying text for a description of Weiler's career employee.
44. See infra notes 53, 89-91, 122 and accompanying text.
45. The book is criticized severely on this point by Matthew Finkin who, like me, believes the law's
primary responsibility is protection of those with the least leverage in the workplace. See Finkin, supra note
37. For my view, see infra notes 96-103 and accompanying text.
46. See infra notes 49-67 and accompanying text.
47. See infra notes 68-88 and accompanying text.
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employee, e.g., through unsafe or unhealthy conditions in the workplace, that
is very much the employee's concern'
Weiler's catalogue seems accurate, and it suggests that the employee will
have a stake in securing protections that are far more complicated than those
covered in a typical material supply contract. However, it is not self-evident
that, standing alone, this difference renders the market an inappropriate forum
for reaching agreement about those interests. In the commercial world, the
market facilitates complicated as well as simple agreements.
But now comes the point that for Weiler is decisive: the emergence of the
career employee. Weiler claims that a "fundamental transformation" in the
nature of the workplace has occurred over the past quarter century 4 -- a change
that post-dates not only the development of the at-will doctrine but even the
enactment of the NLRA. Whereas employment historically tended to be short-
term and the duty expected of employees was simple obedience, in recent years
employers increasingly have encouraged long-term career relationships and
employee participation in shaping both the terms of employment and the
manner in which the work gets done. Employers have opted to retain current
employees even when stronger or cheaper candidates are available in the mar-
ket, to promote from within, and to back-load the package of compensation and
benefits so that employees are induced to stay with the employer throughout
their careers.50
Weiler explains that these career-inducing practices were developed first
at unionized firms and reflected the desires of employees, not employers. They
were adopted at the insistence of the more senior employees, who exercised
particular influence over the shaping of the unions' agendas. Moreover, the
initial adoption of similar practices by nonunion firms was a defensive reaction
prompted by the need to compete for workers and/or to avoid unionization,
again not a reflection that employers preferred this regime.5'
But Weiler insists that many nonunion employers (such as IBM), who have
no need to behave defensively, now embrace the career relationship and find
that it is in the firm's interest to foster such relationships. The advent of the
global economy and the corporate takeover have increased the pressure to maxi-
mize return on capital and made it imperative that businesses react quickly to
competitive challenges, and this makes it attractive for employers to have
continuity: employees (unlike robots) can leave, and when they do the employer
is saddled with substantial recruiting and training costs. In addition, employees,
unlike robots, can be moody; their productivity will vary depending upon their
morale and sense of commitment to the firm. Finally, as American firms learn
from their foreign competitors the benefits of employee participation in deci-
48. Pp. 135-36, 142-44.
49. P. 307.
50. Pp. 63-66, 136-52.
51. Pp. 32, 141, 151.
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sionmaking, they want employees to work together as a team and to utilize their
firm-specific knowledge to make valuable innovative suggestions.
5 2
In Weiler's view, the key to the refutation of Epstein's approach lies in
recognizing the emergence of this career relationship. Weiler agrees with
Epstein that the at-will doctrine was appropriate when employment relationships
tended to be short-term and there was no substantial employee investment that
would be snuffed out by the employer retaining the same right as the employee
to terminate the relationship at any time. 3 But now, with employers paying
long-service employees extra compensation and benefits in order to induce them
to stay, those employees have attained stature in their present jobs that cannot
be replicated anywhere else. Much of what the employer is paying for is job-
specific or at least employer-specific know-how that would not be of value to
other employers-what economists call "firm-specific human capital."54 More-
over, even if the capital is in theory transportable to other employers, the fact
that so many employers now promote from within ("internal labor markets")
means that the career employee, in order to work elsewhere, would have to start
at the bottom of the seniority ladder and wait years to achieve anything approx-
imating her current status.
55
Weiler asserts that a majority of jobs in America are now of this career
type.56 The plight of the career employee as just described-induced to remain
until effectively locked-in-is the predicate of both Weiler's theories for refut-
ing Epstein's market thesis.
2. Weiler's "Moral" Thesis
The traditional at-will legal concept is "morally untenable" in the case of
career employees, Weiler contends, for one reason: such employees "can
rightfully assume that they have some entitlement to retain their position as
long as they are performing their jobs reasonably well. '57 Why that assump-
tion is "rightful" is, of course, the crux of the matter, and Weiler is not alto-
gether convincing on this point. The employee's assumption surely would be
rightful if the employer had promised that in return for long service the employ-
52. Pp. 31-32, 64, 144-52.
53. "From a socioeconomic perspective, the employment relationship (particularly in manual work,
which comprised the majority of jobs at the time) was truly casual and episodic; thus the law's adoption
of a strong presumption of an at-will contract was very much in accordance with workplace life." P. 145
(footnote omitted); see also p. 101: infra notes 89-91, 122 and accompanying text (those employees who
knowingly accept at-will contracts should be held to them).
54. The landmark work on this phenomenon is 0. WILLIAMSON, supra note 13. For particularly
pertinent analysis, see id. at 57-81, 129-30.
55. Pp. 65-66, 139-40.
56. P. 141. This claim is at best arguable in light of recent statistics. See Linder, Governing the
Workplace (Book Review), 9 LAW & INEQUALITY - (1991) (reviewing P. WEILER, supra note 12 (citing
statistics showing, inter alia, that only a small percentage of American workers remain with a single
employer for 20 years or more)).
57. P. 68.
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ee would be protected-even Epstein would enforce contractual promises-but
Weiler's view is that most nonunion career employees do not receive such
promises.5 1 Instead, Weiler weaves a sort of promissory-estoppel-without-a-
promise theory.
Weiler interprets empirical investigations as showing that career employees
are underpaid during the early portion of their careers relative to their marginal
product, and overpaid during the latter part of their careers:5 9
New employees come to work under a regime in which they initially
earn less in pay and benefits than they produce .... This system has
been designed by the firm to induce workers to remain in its employ,
because the employees realize that eventually they will reap the benefits
of the system when they have put in sufficient time under it.6"
My difficulty with this account is two-fold: it defies economic theory and
it defies common sense. To begin with the latter, why, absent a promise of
future benefit, would employees accept employment at less than they could earn
elsewhere? Weiler's answer-that they know the employer's treatment of long-
service employees and assume they will be allowed to reach that status-is
inconsistent with his assertions elsewhere that most employees at time of hire
are ignorant of the employer's employment practices. 61 Moreover, Weiler's
candidates for career employment are sophisticated folks; why would they
assume that longevity is assured when the employer conspicuously has withheld
any such assurance?
Even less plausible is Weiler's account of the employer's motivation. It is
not hard to see why employers would underpay new hires if they could get
away with it. But why would employers pay senior employees more than they
are worth? Weiler's answer, in effect, is that employers value career employees
so highly they will overpay them to retain them. That answer is its own refuta-
tion.
These common sense doubts about Weiler's "moral" thesis are corroborated
by economic theory. It may be true that employees at the time of hire accept
58. Pp. 77-78. Matthew Finkin vigorously disputes Weiler's assumption that there is no contractual
promise in the case of most career employees. Finkin, supra note 37. In Finkin's view, employers regularly
make such promises, but in a fashion that, while persuasive to employees, is not enforced by the courts.
He cites, as examples, oral promises that some courts hold violative of the statute of frauds and/or too
"indefinite" to be enforceable, and written representations in handbooks that courts ignore because of
disclaimer clauses that employees do not read or understand. Id. Weiler's description of the career relation-
ship provides powerful empirical support for reforming these legal doctrines, as Finkin urges, to uphold
such representations on estoppel if not on contractual grounds. This is not, however, Weiler's thesis. As
Finkin notes, Weiler never mentions the oral promise and expressly endorses the rulings exonerating
employers who make disclaimers. Id. (citing pp. 54-55, 101).
59. Pp. 64-67.
60. P. 67.
61. See infra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
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less in wages and benefits from some employers than they could earn else-
where, but Weiler is mistaken in thinking that this means they are being
"underpaid" and are counting on being "overpaid" later in their careers. What
Weiler is overlooking is that the IBM-type employers he is discussing impart
substantial training to new employees, some of which is general (i.e., not firm-
specific) and thus is transportable. It is standard economic doctrine that, while
employees will not accept lower wages to receive firm-specific training, they
often will make short-term wage sacrifices to secure training that is transport-
able; thus in the usual scenario some wage sacrifice for general training is
predictable.62 This does not mean they are being "underpaid," but rather that
a portion of their compensation is in the form of training.
Conversely, once the employee has received training from the employer,
the employer is likely to pay a wage premium, both to reduce the chances that
the employee will exit with the general training and to reflect the increased
value of the employee to the employer.63 Nothing in this scenario supports
Weiler's vision that employees knowingly accept substandard compensation in
their early years with a firm in reliance upon a unilateral assumption that they
will be overpaid decades later. Career employees are paid more later because
they are worth more to the employer then, not as delayed compensation for
earlier contributions.rC
Weiler's attempt to refute Epstein's thesis with a "moral" claim on behalf
of career employees thus rests entirely on a factual assumption that is incor-
62. F. MACHLUP, THE ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION AND HUMAN CAPITAL 434-35 (1984):
General training is an investment in the worker's capacity to perform and earn not just in his
present employment but in many other jobs too, if he is free to quit and collect higher wages
working for another employer, the firm that provides free training may lose money. Hence, even
if firms "finance" general training of their employees, they can rationally afford to do so only
if the cost of the training is shifted to the trainee. This shifting takes place through lower wages
being paid to workers receiving these valuable learning experiences.
Matters are different in the case of specific training, an investment in the workers' capacity
to perform in the job for which they are trained, in the firm that provides the training but not else-
where. In this case, although the firm would lose if the trained employee were to quit, the worker
too would lose, since what he has learned cannot improve his performance elsewhere. Thus, the
risk of trained workers leaving their jobs is small and firms can afford to bear the cost of specific
training.
In actual fact, most kinds of training are partly general, partly specific; it is most likely,
therefore, that the cost of in-service training is shared between worker and employer, not in any
explicit way, but in the implied form of the trainees' wages being somewhat lower [during the
training period] than the wages of unskilled workers in the same locality and same occupation;
the trainees' wages are likely to increase with work experience.
63. Id. at 435 ("In order to reduce the risk of losing the investment in its workers, a firm would offer
'higher wages after training than could be received elsewhere. In effect, it would offer employees some of
the return from training."') (quoting G. BECKER, HUMAN CAPITAL 22 (1964)).
64. Weiler reads too much into the empirical studies showing that wages increase faster than productivi-
ty. Of necessity, such studies can measure only tangible evidence of productivity. But the firm-specific
human capital that firms value in career employees yields benefits to the firm-such as suggested innova-




rect.65 If there is a unique moral claim to be advanced for career
employees, 6 it would have to be rooted in promises of continued employment
communicated to such employees. But as noted earlier, Weiler, unlike other
observers, believes that career employees generally do not receive such promis-
es.6
7
3. Weiler's "Economic" Thesis
a. The Lock-in of the Career Employee
Weiler's second assault upon Epstein's market thesis is grounded in eco-
nomic considerations. Epstein's thesis assumes the existence of a "spot mar-
ket"--a daily auction in which employers bid against each other for the services
of prospective employees-to which the employee may always repair if dissatis-
fied with the current employer's terms. But, Weiler insists, the career employee,
possessed of firm-specific capital that is valuable only to the current employer
and general training that is transportable only in theory (because other employ-
ers' internal labor markets prevent lateral entry), is effectively locked in.
Because the market approach depends upon competition, and because nobody
will compete with the incumbent employer for the career employee's full range
of talents, Weiler concludes that the market will not work. This lock-in effect
upon career employees "inhibits the play of market forces that function most
effectively in settings where there is flexibility and mobility in the competition
for services."68 In effect, the employer has become a monopsonist, the only
bidder for the employee's full range of talents.
According to Weiler, new employees enjoy a competitive market, and in
theory could negotiate for job protection, but probably won't. He reasons that
employees when first hired often suffer from an information gap, in that they
(unlike the employer) do not know the employer's practices and thus do not
realize the need for protection. 9 Moreover, when first hired they lack the
65. My view on this point is not shared by Samuel Issacharoff, who finds Weiler's demonstration
wholly persuasive. Issachoroff, supra note 26, at 621-23.
66. I shall later discuss a moral claim (redistribution of wealth) that would be applicable to all
employees. See infra notes 96-103 and accompanying text.
67. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
68. P. 141; see also p. 76.
69. Pp. 74-75. The information gap is the only significant market imperfection that Weiler identifies
as applicable to new hires. That gap can be a significant imperfection with respect to a subject like safety
and health, where the imbalance of knowledge at the time of hire is likely to be enormous. But in the case
of discharge, I wonder whether it is really substantial at all. My doubt is premised upon an empirical
question as to which neither Weiler nor I has data: What is the state of mind of the typical job applicant?
If most job applicants assume that there is a risk of discharge, but also assume that it happens infrequently,
and if that is in fact the case, the lack of hard information does not impair their negotiating position.
Weiler also suggests that workers, even those possessed of information, tend to discount irrationally
the risks of adverse consequences in the workplace. Pp. 74-75. That may be true, and there is surely a school
that advocates legal intervention on the paternalistic premise that the government must save some parties
from their own foolishness in the marketplace, but Weiler does not develop a theory as to why that should
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investment of time in the employer that would make protection against job loss
a high priority. Only after they have been there awhile do they acquire both
the information needed to bargain intelligently over job-loss protection and the
incentive to do so; but by then, per Weiler's thesis, they have been locked in
and lack the leverage to get it. (As only new employees are comparison shop-
pers, they alone will have the capacity for choice that provides the competitive
leverage necessary to make a traditional market work.)7°
The career relationship, Weiler contends, justifies the law's intervention to
prevent wrongful discharges, despite the costs that Epstein shows (and Weiler
concedes71) will result from such regulation. The employer has "locked in" its
senior employees: they do not have the benefit of a competitive market in
dealing with their current employer, and so they have no leverage to negotiate
for protections against job loss.7"
b. Bilateral Monopoly: The Lock-in Works Both Ways
Weiler is wholly persuasive in showing that Epstein's "spot-market" com-
petitive model is inapplicable to these career employees. But the simple monop-
oly model also does not apply, for in the career relationship story Weiler tells,
the lock-in phenomenon is a two-way street. While it is true that the senior
employee is locked in, so is the employer: the employer cannot afford to lose
this employee without suffering an enormous productivity, recruiting, and
training cost. There will not be replacements who have the employer-specific
knowledge possessed by this employee.
Thus, there is a bilateral monopoly: the employer cannot find another
supplier of labor who offers the job-specific bundle of talents that the incum-
bent employee possesses, and the employee cannot find another employer who
wants that bundle of talents. Oliver Williamson has described nicely the
transition from competition to bilateral monopoly that characterizes this type
of relationship:
There is no longer parity with rivals, however, once the initial
supplier undertakes substantial investments in durable transaction-
specific assets. In such cases, both buyers and suppliers have a strong
interest in preserving the continuity of the exchange, since economic
values would be sacrificed if the ongoing supply relation were to be
terminated.... Accordingly, what was a competitive market with a
large number of bidders at the outset is effectively transformed into one
of bilateral monopoly thereafter.73
apply to wrongful discharge (or, for that matter, to the employment relationship generally) more readily
than to other important transactions that people negotiate in the marketplace.
70. P. 76.
71. Pp. 79-80, 154-59.
72. Pp. 76, 141.
73. Williamson, supra note 12, at 1202-03.
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Intuitively, employees seem to enjoy greater protection in this bilateral monopo-
ly than Weiler's analysis suggests. For example, if we ask how likely it is that
an employer would discharge a senior employee who possesses firm-specific
human capital, we should expect that this would occur only when the grounds
for doing so were so strong that they would have survived a contractual or legal
constraint against frivolous discharge had one been applicable. In essence, the
employer's interest in not losing its investment in the career employee serves
the same purpose as would a contractual or legal bar.
Of course, it is possible to imagine individual instances in which managers
would subordinate their firm's interest to the satisfaction of some personal
vendetta against a career employee. But the employer who has invested heavily
in human capital will have an enormous incentive to create internal constraints
against managerial behavior so inconsistent with the interests of the enterprise.
Not surprisingly, many of these employers have created internal grievance
procedures by which employees may challenge a discharge to higher levels of
management. Those procedures may be seen as a benefit conferred upon
employees, but their likely motivation is a desire to protect the employer's
investment in those employees.
c. Dividing the Surplus Created by the Bilateral Monopoly: Should We
Care?
Let us now examine more rigorously whether, as a general proposition, this
intuition that the employee is protected in the bilateral monopoly relationship
holds true-true enough to satisfy us that the law need not intervene. This
relationship has generated a surplus: the added value to the employer of retain-
ing the employee with the firm-specific human capital as compared to hiring
a replacement lacking that capital.74 The proper question, if we are to assess
74. Epstein assumes that the bilateral monopoly exists only with respect to that surplus, for he presumes
that the employee has access to other jobs in the competitive market for the skills she possesses apart from
that capital and that the employer can find other employees in the competitive market who possess all but
the firm-specific skills. Epstein, Contract at Vill, supra note 18, at 975. In practice, this assumption may
not prove true. If most employers adhere to internal labor markets (i.e., promote from within), a skilled
employee cannot transfer directly from a high-level job with one employer to the same job at another, but
instead must start at an entry-level job with a new employer and with a beginner's seniority. See supra text
accompanying note 55. The employer's control then will extend beyond the surplus.
Moreover, whatever protections career employees enjoy against frivolous discharge, they are not
absolute. The career employees will have a legitimate concern that there may come a time when the
mutuality of the parties' interdependence will no longer serve as a safeguard against discharge. The employ-
er's technology or product line may change, and the employee's specialized skills may then be of less value
to the employer, or, as the employee grows older, the employer may be animated by a desire to find "new
blood" or to avoid continued pension accrual by an employee close to retirement age. In circumstances like
these, the intuition that the bilateral monopoly will protect the employee falls away. It is thus not surprising
that the law has seen fit to protect employees against age discrimination and discrimination to prevent
pension accrual. See Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 621 (1982); ERISA, 29
U.S.C. § 1140 (1982).
Conversely, if the employer has provided extensive training that is not firm specific, the employee may
enjoy substantial leverage because that training can be transported and the law will not allow the employer
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Weiler's "economic" case against the market, is whether there is justification,
on efficiency grounds, for legal intervention into the process by which employ-
ers and employees in a bilateral monopoly will divide the surplus it produces.
(i) Neoclassical Economics: We Shouldn't Care How the Surplus
Is Divided
Neoclassical economists appear not to care how the surplus winds up being
distributed between the two parties. Thus Epstein, who recognizes that jobs
creating firm-specific human capital fit the bilateral monopoly model rather than
the spot market model,75 insists that so long as the wage remains above the
competitive wage available to the employee in the market (i.e., the wage she
could receive for her talents minus the firm-specific human capital), both parties
will have incentive to reach agreement, and society's only interest-that that
human capital be utilized so that social wealth is maximized-will be satis-
fied.
76
Epstein hypothesizes that if the parties have roughly equal bargaining
power, they will choose to divide the surplus equally.77 And he assumes, based
on a superficial weighing of several factors, that on average such an equal
distribution in fact occurs in the workplace.7 That however is not Epstein's
main point. Rather, he insists, there is no reason for the law to interfere no
matter how the surplus is divided:
The whole question of inequality of bargaining power arises in the
bounded context of how much of a supracompetitive wage the worker
will obtain. At the very worst, the worker will get the amount that is
offered in some alternate employment where he has built up no specific
capital. To try to formulate and administer a set of legal rules that will
allow some trier of fact to measure the size of the surplus embedded
in the ongoing transaction, and to allocate half (or more) of it to the
worker, cannot be done at any social cost that is less than the expected
size of the surplus itself, if it can be done at all. The entire exercise is
fraught with the possibility of real error, as real resources would have
to protect itself indefinitely through covenants not to compete. See H. SPECTER & M. FINKIN, I INDIVIDUAL
EMPLOYMENT LAW AND LITIGATION 459-64 (1989).
75. Epstein, Contract at Will, supra note 18, at 973-77.
76. Id. at 973-75.
77. Id. at 974-75. This hardly seems self-evident. If, for example, the employer has had to invest
enormous resources to train an employee of merely average capacities, it might be that the employer is
entitled to more, while if the employer's training investment has been small and the surplus generated largely
because of the employee's unique talents the reverse would apply.
78. Id. at 975-76. The factors Epstein considers that favor the employer are greater resources and more
experience in negotiations. Favoring the employee are the employer's need to rely upon agents to negotiate,
the employee's lower opportunity cost for the time spent negotiating, and the employee's knowledge of the
employer's reservation price (revealed in negotations with other employees). The employer's greater wealth
would enable it to hold out longer, but by the same token its resolve may be weaker because what it would
gain by holding out is of less importance to it. Id.
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to be expended solely to make transfer payments that in no way enhance
productive efforts.
79
(ii) Weiler: We Should Care How the Surplus Is Divided
Weiler recognizes that the relationship between employer and career em-
ployee is a bilateral monopoly, because the employer is locked in as well as
the employee. But his analysis begins and ends with the observation that despite
its bilateral character the employee will be the loser:
[W]hile it is true, as a market proponent would point out, that
the employer also suffers some tangible loss when an employee
leaves.., the senior employee loses the only job she has, while
the firm loses only one of what may be a workforce composed
of thousands of such employees.8 0
Thus, Weiler concludes, the employee will blink first, and there is an "imbal-
ance of power" that enables the employer to dictate terms. Ironically, Weiler
cites as corroboration a phenomenon that Epstein relies upon for the opposite
thesis: the virtual absence of contractual protection against job loss in nonunion
workplaces. Weiler posits that senior employees could not possibly want this
vulnerability and notes that similarly situated employees upon unionizing
immediately bargain for and obtain such protection. He rejects the possibility
that this reflects self-selection, those wanting such protection opting for union-
ism to get it. Rather, he believes, this reflects the reality that locked-in employ-
ees lack the leverage to secure even the most basic protections."1
I have no doubt that Weiler, by virtue of his real-world experience, 2 is
better positioned than Epstein to evaluate the relative bargaining powers of
employers and employees, and my own experience representing nonunion career
employees leads me to believe that Weiler's assessment in this instance is
correct. Still this responds only to Epstein's minor theme, a veritable throwaway
in Epstein's analysis. Epstein's main point is that we should not care whether
an imbalance of bargaining power produces a one-sided distribution of the
surplus, so long as the distribution leaves the employee with more than is
available elsewhere and thus does not lead to society's loss of the firm-specific
human capital. To this, Weiler proffers no response at all.
79. Id. at 976.
80. P. 22. The same point is made, in different words, at P. 50.
81. Pp. 77-78, 183-84.
82. See supra note 15.
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(iii) Can the Case for Caring How the Surplus Is Divided Be
Strengthened?
Weiler cannot declare victory at beating Epstein's theory with an alternative
efficiency-based theory until he refutes this point. There are, arguably, two
ways in which bilateral monopolies can be inefficient, even if outcomes merely
divide the surplus: transaction costs and suboptimal outcomes (from society's
standpoint) attributable to absence of countervailing power.
[a] Transaction Costs
The existence of a surplus and no competitive market to determine how it
should be distributed creates what Oliver Williamson terms "a serious dilemma
in contracting." 83 The upshot may be opportunistic haggling which at a mini-
mum is costly and at the extreme might lead to a breakdown in the relationship
with consequent loss to society of the surplus.84
This concern, whatever its force in other contexts, seems unimportant in
the employment setting. Those who are familiar with nonunion employment
will know that such negotiations rarely are complex and almost never break
down entirely.85 Epstein speculates that the reasons parties to the employment
relationship reach agreement so easily are their familiarity with one another's
preferences and the existence of benchmarks from the outcomes of negotiations
with other employees.86 It might as easily be suggested that, as Weiler's
analysis indicates, the bargaining power is so lopsided that the employee will
take whatever crumbs of the surplus the employer offers. Whatever the reason,
there is no theory on the table that explains why legal intervention is needed
in the nonunion employment context to avoid transaction costs.
[b] Bilateralism Without Countervailing Power
The other basis for positing the inefficiency of the bilateral monopoly is
that society should not be indifferent as to how the surplus is divided.87 The
argument proceeds in essence as follows. Each monopoly, standing alone, has
the potential to produce inefficient outcomes. The assumption that their concur-
rence avoids those inefficient outcomes will be correct only if the two monopo-
lies are of roughly equal strength; that is, if each furnishes its possessor suffi-
cient bargaining power to resist the other's potential for monopolistic exploi-
83. Williamson, supra note 12, at 1203.
84. Id.
85. There have been rare instances in which professional athletes have sat out a season rather than
accept the employer's best offer, but few employees can afford that strategy.
86. Epstein, Contract at Will, supra note 18, at 975.
87. A recent articulation of this theory appears in Cirace, A Synthesis of Lan' and Economics, 44 SW.
L.J. 1139, 1175-76 (1990).
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tation. It is not inevitable that countervailing monopolies will have this proper-
ty. Thus, if one party is better able to exploit its monopoly position than the
other, the inefficient outcomes we would fear from a unilateral monopoly may
still result.
For example, let us assume, with Weiler, that the employer can stand the
loss of the employee better than the latter the loss of her job, and thus that the
employee will yield virtually all of the surplus to the employer. Epstein dismiss-
es this as of no consequence, declaring that the parties are merely jousting over
a "supracompetitive" wage. 8 But the employee in question has capacities not
shared by those in the competitive market; the issue is the compensation to be
paid for these greater capacities. If the employee receives too small a return
for these enhanced capacities, there may be a decline in the employee's pro-
ductivity and an attendant loss to society caused by a reduction in the firm's
optimal productivity. Yet this strategy may be optimal from the firm's stand-
point, for the monopoly rents extracted from the employee may, despite the
lesser production, exceed in value the additional profits that could be garnered
from increased production discounted by the higher compensation that would
have to be paid to the employee to secure that increased production. In short,
if bargaining power is sufficiently disparate, bilateral monopolies in the work-
place have potential to produce the same injuries to society as simple monopo-
lies, and there is the same justification for legal intervention. Laws that "equal-
ize" bargaining power, as the NLRA undertakes to do, would (if they worked)
remove the venom that is potential in workplace bilateral monopolies, for with
such equalization the neutralizing potential of the offsetting monopolies would
be realized.
Let us take stock. Weiler has set out to refute the market advocates' claim
that labor markets are efficient and that there is no need for legal intervention.
Weiler has successfully shown (if we buy his account of the career relationship
in today's employment setting) that the market advocates' spot-market "compe-
tition-between-employers" model is inapposite to most jobs in the current
workplace. But he has not fully answered Epstein's contention that the resultant
bilateral monopoly likewise does not justify legal intervention. I have suggested
some possible rejoinders to Epstein, but I would not be so bold as to pronounce
victory upon the issue.
E. Alternative Approaches to Refuting the Market Thesis: Justice for Unskilled
Workers as Well as Yuppies
However, no matter how this debate proceeds, I am disquieted by the
thought that the future course of American labor law might turn on its resolu-
tion. Weiler's ultimate conclusion is that we need the law's intervention to help
88. See passage quoted supra text accompanying note 79.
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only the relatively affluent workers who possess special talents, not the low-
paid unskilled and semi-skilled workers who have been the prime concern of
labor laws until now. His scheme would leave the latter without legal protec-
tion.89 If all modern relationships were of the new type Weiler describes, this
dichotomy would be of no concern. But the reality is that today, as yesterday,
the least advantaged workers in America do not have career relationships; those
who clean office buildings at night, scrub dishes in restaurants, drive trucks,
or serve customers in fast-food restaurants-and these are among the fastest
growing jobs in America--do not, by and large, advance up career ladders
of the sort Weiler describes. Weiler's thesis would lead to the creation of a
two-tiered scheme in which the affluent would enjoy legal protection while
those at the bottom would be relegated to the market.91 My intuition-I sus-
pect shared by many people-is that this is not the direction in which the law
should be going.
I see two possible justifications, not explored by Weiler, for legal interven-
tion on behalf of all employees-whether that intervention takes the form of
direct statutory conferral of benefits or strengthening of the right to collective
bargaining. One, which is consistent with Epstein's assumption that inefficiency
is the sole justification for intervention in the market, asserts that individual em-
ployees want, but cannot negotiate efficiently for, employment benefits that
possess the characteristic of a "public good," i.e., benefits that cannot be fur-
nished to one employee without simultaneously being provided to all. 92 The
other approach is operative if society determines not to accept efficiency as the
sole justification for legal intervention and instead elects to intervene for the
purpose of redistributing wealth..
Crucial to both is a recognition that employees seek to satisfy many inter-
ests through their jobs beyond merely bringing home a paycheck. Workers
spend a good deal of their lives in the workplace, developing friends, habits,
and interests; it is important to them that the work environment be pleasurable
and that it not be taken from them by unwarranted discharge. Employees hope
to secure intellectual satisfaction and psychological self-esteem from their work;
it is important that they not be deprived of deserved promotions and that their
interests in participating in the creative life of the workplace be vindicated.
Moreover, employees have a vital stake in the health and integrity of their
bodies; it is important that the workplace provide occupational safety and
health.
89. Pp. 144-45, 48.
90. P. 108 n.7.
91. Indeed, as we shall see shortly, hifta notes 122-24 and accompanying text, Weiler does wind up
proposing legal rules that favor only career employees.
92. The leading work on public goods is M. OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC
GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965).
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1. Solving the "Public Goods" Problem
The neoclassical economic approach would posit that an employee desirous
of vindicating these interests need only purchase them from the employer, i.e.,
accept a lower salary in exchange for the employer's providing the desired
benefits. For example, the employee who wants protection against discharge
without just cause might "pay" the employer, through a lower salary, for the
employer's cost of providing that protection. That approach might actually work
for protection against discharge, which an employer could provide to some
employees without necessarily providing it to others,93 but many of the other
nonmonetary interests employees will wish to pursue are not of that character.
Consider, for example, an employee's desire that the employer reduce the
level of toxic emissions in the factory. The employer could not deliver that
benefit to one employee without simultaneously delivering it to all others. And
the cost of reducing toxic emissions would likely exceed the total salary of the
one employee, so that the employee could not possibly afford it and in any
event would not deem the cost worth bearing. Plainly, this is a benefit that can
be purchased, if at all, only by the collective contribution of many employees,
who must agree that the pro rata cost of a collective purchase is worth bearing
and who are able to get together to discover their mutual interest and to bargain
with the employer for its realization. Indeed, there would seem to be two
ingredients essential to negotiating for the benefit: (1) the employees (or at least
a large number of them) must get together and agree that they all wish to spend
an agreed-upon sum to purchase this benefit; and (2) there must be some means
to impose the fair share of the costs of the benefit upon those employees who
would not be willing to spend the necessary sum (or who would attempt to
"free ride") but who would inevitably enjoy the benefit were it purchased.
There are only two ways that these conditions for an efficient exchange can
be met, and both require rejecting the traditional market approach: through
governmental imposition of the benefit (as by the Occupational Safety and
Health Act)94 or through creation of a system of collective employee bargain-
ing in which the collective decision can be imposed upon nonconsenting
employees by requiring them to contribute their pro rata share of the purchase
price (as by unionization under the NLRA.)95
93. Ironically, Weiler invokes the "public goods" problem as a market imperfection only in his
discussion of protection against discharge where it is least persuasive and where in consequence he is
obliged to acknowledge that it has relatively little weight, p. 75. An employer could, after all, maintain the
records necessary to justify its discharge actions only for employees who have been provided such promises,
while proceeding differently (and without additional expense) as to those who have not.
94. 29 U.S.C. § 651 et seq. (1982). Note that OSHA does not necessarily increase the employer's over-
all labor costs, as the employer might reduce wages to recapture the increased cost of occupational safety
and health. Thus, it is possible to envision OSHA as a nondistributional means of facilitating purchases of
health and safety.
95. Section 9(a) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1988). provides that a union selected by a majority
of the employees in a bargaining unit becomes the exclusive bargaining representative of all employees in
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What is true of safety and health is true of a great number of interests that
employees may wish to advance through negotiations with their employer.
Group insurance is cheaper than individual insurance, and many employees thus
are likely to want to purchase the provision of such coverage from their em-
ployer; but it is necessary to agree what kinds and amounts of insurance the
employer will provide to the group, and to secure collective employee payment.
Many opportunities in the workplace are scarce and must be distributed to
employees in some fashion; many employees may have an interest in securing
an equitable mechanism (such as seniority) for allocating opportunities for
promotions, order of layoffs, priority for securing desired overtime, priority for
escaping undesired overtime, etc. Many employees would like the employer to
shut down for two weeks during the summer so that all can vacation at the
optimal time; failing that, there will be need to determine who has priority in
choosing vacation dates. Many employees would like a grievance-arbitration
system, but it is expensive and can be purchased only by group effort. The list
could be expanded to include virtually all subjects contained in the typical
collective bargaining agreement, once we get past wage rates and discharge-
protection.
Ironically, it is the focus on wages and discharges in Epstein's analysis,
which Weiler tracks, that has drawn the combatants' attention away from the
"public goods" issue that attends virtually every other aspect of the employment
relationship. Once we shift our attention to these other aspects, the case for
governmental intervention into the workplace can be made on neoclassical
efficiency grounds. That intervention might take the form of government-
dictated terms applicable to all workplaces (the group decision having been
made nationally in support of the legislation) or sanctioning of a collective bar-
gaining representative that can facilitate group decisionmaking and bind poten-
tial free riders (enabling separate group decisionmaking at each workplace).
And the case for intervention in either form is just as strong for the low-paid
worker as for the career employee.
2. Redistributing Wealth
The second justification for rejecting Epstein's market thesis will be applica-
ble if a societal determination is made to use the law to redistribute wealth from
capitalists to workers. The case for redistributing wealth from shareholders to
workers can be made on two levels. First, even if such redistribution does not
maximize overall social wealth, a majority in society controlling its legislative
agenda is entitled to determine that the greater marginal utility of money to the
less privileged justifies more equitable allocation of resources even if the loss
the unit, with the power to bind those who did not choose it and who do not agree with the choices it makes.
See, e.g., Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Org., 420 U.S. 50 (1975); Ford Motor
Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953): J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944).
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to total societal wealth exceeds in absolute dollars the gain to the poor."
Second, wholly apart from considerations of marginal utility, perceptions of
historical injustice may persuade some that redistribution from capital to labor
is warranted. In that view, the present distribution of wealth is not pre-ordained
"right" but merely represents the consequence of the rather arbitrary decision
made in the nineteenth century to treat suppliers of capital but not suppliers of
labor as "owners" of the enterprise. That legal ordering was not inevitable; it
was merely conventional. Employees can reasonably argue that they make the
greater contribution to the enterprise, committing not only their labor but the
bulk of their waking lives, and indeed their bodies as well. Society might
choose not to accept the disparities visited by the law of the past and commit
present bargaining to a market in which each side must deal from the histori-
cally determined status quo.97
To argue that a desire for redistribution of wealth justifies intervention into
the labor market requires taking on Epstein's assertion that wealth redistribution
can be accomplished more efficiently through tax and welfare laws than through
labor laws.98 There are two rejoinders to Epstein. First, as David Strauss
96. See Hovenkamp, Legislation, Well-Being, and Public Choice, 57 U. CI. L. REV. 63, 70-71, 74
(1990) (discussing marginal utility of money and ability of policy makers to choose to maximize well-being
instead of wealth).
97. See Kronman, Wealth Maximization as a Normative Principle, 9 J. LEGAL STuD. 227, 240 (1980).
As Charles Fried has pointed out (responding to Epstein's claim that the NLRA's quite modest expropriation
of employer property is unwarranted), arguments such as these "cut[] beneath the level at which [Epstein's]
analysis begins." Fried explains:
Epstein's analysis is vulnerable at its central premise: the definition of the property rights
involved. Only by assuming that the preexisting common law system of property rights had some
natural, preconventional status can the expropriationary thrust of the Wagner Act (to the extent
that there is one) be criticized. If, however, property rights are-as thinkers from Kant to Nozick
have held-essentially conventional, then Epstein runs up against the problem of showing why
the Wagner Act system does not represent simply a redefinition by society of what have always
been social conventions in any event.
Fried, Individual and Collective Rights in Work Relations: Reflections on the Current State of Labor Law
and Its Prospects, 51 U. CHI. L. REv. 1012, 1022, 1016 (1984) (footnotes omitted).
98. It requires, as well, answering those who claim that wealth redistribution ultimately cannot be
effected through the labor laws-a claim that surfaces whenever increases in the minimum wage are
proposed. For me, it is sufficient that tax laws can be used to generate revenues that will then be spent
(redistributed) according to choices reflected in the labor laws. I develop this point infra notes 102-03 and
accompanying text, and more fully in Gottesman, Twelve Topics To Consider Before Opting for Racial
Quotas, 79 GEo. L.J. 1737 (1991). Accordingly, I do not dwell on the issue whether such redistribution
can be accomplished through labor laws alone. The competing arguments on this latter point are reviewed
in F. MACHLUP, supra note 62, at 96-99.
It is clear that unionization historically produced a 10-15% wage premium. P. 13 n.6; Stewart, Union
Wage Differentials. Product Market Ifluences and the Division of Rents, 100 EcON. J. 1122 (Dec. 1990).
But unionization occurred principally in cartelized industries, and the premium represented a capture of part
of the rents already being obtained by the employers by reason of their cartel. P. 132-33; Stewart, supra,
at 1122-23. Where this occurred, there may have been a true redistribution of wealth, for income was
transferred from shareholders to workers. However, if an industry was sufficiently cartelized, the sharehold-
ers may have been able to recapture from consumers through higher prices what was lost, in which event
the redistribution was from consumers (themselves largely workers) to workers, an event with far less
redistributive consequences.
There is a serious debate among economists whether wealth can be redistributed at all from shareholders
to workers in noncartelized industries. Those who claim not argue that shareholders will leave the market
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recently observed in a somewhat analogous context, there is a great difference
in the culture of our society between a recipient of a transfer payment and one
who has earned a benefit through working.99 The latter is perceived as an
achiever, the former a failure. This difference is important to the psychological
well-being of the recipient, but even more critically it is likely to affect whether
society chooses to bestow the benefit at all. There may be little societal impetus
to make increased transfer payments to the poor, yet much greater disposition
to provide increased rewards for work.10° This may be especially true if, as
I next discuss, the question is whether to provide employees nonmonetary
protections in circumstances that command great public sympathy, as in the
case of occupational safety and health.
Second, and more fundamentally, many of the benefits society might wish
for moral or aesthetic reasons to assure that employees enjoy (e.g., self-esteem,
intellectual satisfaction, bodily integrity) are not monetary in nature and thus
not easily deliverable through transfer payments. Providing such opportunities
is costly and may reduce the employer's profits; the employer will not be dis-
posed to provide them to those lacking the power to extract them in bargaining.
These are goals that many employees cannot secure for themselves in the mar-
ket.
There is a school of economics that treats all interests as commodifiable;
that school would point out that there is some price at which a worker would
forego each of the interests I have described.101 Nonetheless, there are several
reasons why society might choose to disregard the equation. From an aesthetic
standpoint, it might prefer that employees retain their limbs rather than sell
them for a price they found acceptable. Society might also be concerned that
there will be costs that others, not the employee, must bear because of his
handicap. Finally, employees would put widely varying price tags on these
interests, as they are highly subjective; it would thus be difficult and expensive
in search of a higher return on their capital if the law reduces the return available from corporate investment.
Stewart, supra, at 1122. Opponents argue that there are quasi-rents that can be captured, i.e., that there is
some margin of reduced profit that shareholders will accept without withdrawing their capital. F. MACHLUP,
supra note 62, at 97-99.
Apart from shareholders, the likeliest bearers of increased employment costs are consumers (assuming
that all competitors in the market are subject to the same increased costs and thus can increase their prices
to reflect them). But even if increased employment costs can be passed on to consumers, there is, as already
noted, a question of how meaningful a redistribution of wealth will result, given that most consumers are
themselves workers. It is this consideration that prompts Weiler to despair at making wealth redistribution
a goal of the employment laws. P. 123.
99. Strauss, The Law and Economics of Racial Discrimination in Employment, 79 GEo. L.J. 1619, 1631
(1991). Strauss argues that racial quotas in employment are justified to help overcome the disadvantage
blacks have suffered from historic discrimination visited outside the workplace as well as within. In the
passage discussed in text Strauss is responding to the argument that transfer payments are a better vehicle
than employment quotas for overcoming that disadvantage.
100. Id. at 1630-31.
101. For example, this notion is implicit in Richard Posner's belief that the goal of judicial decision-
making is wealth maximization. For a discussion of Posner's tendency to treat all interests as commodifiable,
see Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1857 n.38 (1987).
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for the law to redistribute the "wealth" associated with these interests through
monetary transfer payments.
This recitation suggests two ways in which the nonmonetary character of
benefits points to intervention through the labor law. First, it is likelier that
there will be a societal consensus to tackle a particular workplace problem such
as safety and health than a consensus to redistribute wealth in the abstract.
Second, it is more efficient to decide just once what should be spent to reduce
workplace accidents than to arrive on a case-by-case basis at a "price" to pay
to each employee losing a limb in lieu of avoiding those accidents. In the real
world, the nonmonetary interests we have been discussing likely will be
protected through the labor laws or not at all.
But, it may be argued, what I have said to this point does not refute
Epstein's assertion that if we wish to redistribute wealth we can do it through
transfer payments; if we provide monetary transfers through the tax system,
employees could afford to sacrifice wages to purchase these nonmonetary
benefits (the transferred money would replace the wages sacrificed). Indeed,
the argument might go, that is the preferable approach, for it allows each
employee to decide whether the benefit is worth the purchase price, rather than
having the government make a paternalistic decision that binds all.t 2 Ulti-
mately, the response to this argument is the same as that presented earlier
within the efficiency model: the "public goods" character of most of the inter-
ests in question precludes their purchase by individual employees. Thus, a
model that would redistribute wealth, just as a model that would accept the
present allocation of wealth, points ultimately to either collective bargaining
or government dictation as the means for ordering "public goods" in the
workplace. Tax laws might generate the revenues, but we need labor laws to
achieve their optimal distribution.0 3
102. I am indebted to my colleague Warren Schwartz for pointing out the need for me to address this
issue.
103. That collective bargaining can be a vehicle for distributing revenues generated by tax laws will
be evident from the discussions supra notes 93-95, 98 and accompanying text and infra notes 192-93 and
accompanying text. For example, government could allocate tax-generated revenues in specified amounts
for improving each employer's workplace health and safety leaving the choice as to how best to utilize the
revenues for that purpose to collective decisionmaking.
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II. WEILER ON GOVERNMENT REGULATION
Whether or not Weiler is ultimately convincing in his effort to refute the
neoclassical economists' case for trusting the market-indeed, even if such
refutation were impossible at an academic level-there seems little doubt that
legal intervention in labor markets will continue to be the accepted norm in our
society. From a practical standpoint, the real debate is whether intervention
should be direct (government dictation of employment terms) or indirect
(strengthening collective bargaining). It is to this debate that Weiler makes his
strongest contribution.
A. The Problems with Government Regulation of Employment Terms
The predominant view among scholars today is that, with the decline of
unionism, government regulation will become the predominant monitor of the
employer-employee relationship. That prospect is greeted with enthusiasm by
some10 4 and accepted with disappointment by others who believe, with
Weiler, that collective bargaining is the preferable approach. 105 Whatever the
desirability of government regulation of employers on behalf of employees, the
experience of the past decade surely suggests that it is a growing enterprise. 10 6
Weiler is a sharp critic of the drift toward acceptance of increased govern-
ment regulation as a substitute for collective bargaining. He acknowledges the
surface appeal of government regulation. It proffers "a somewhat neutral and
detached" legislature or court to determine what rights are appropriate and
purports to extend them to all employees, not merely those who take the
initiative and have the leverage needed to win them in collective bargain-
ing."0 7 And, perhaps most important, it is a form of protection that all em-
ployees can help obtain. If reaching the employer at the bargaining table has
failed for most Americans, there is an alternative route by which the employer
can be reached. Employees constitute a majority of the voting populace. Em-
ployee voting power can be the antidote for insufficient bargaining power.
Simply stated, employees can win from the legislature what they could not get
at the bargaining table.'08
But offsetting these benefits are disadvantages that Weiler sees as decisive.
Most issues in the workplace are too complex and too varied to be dealt with
by government. For example, the government could not possibly determine the
appropriate wage for each job of each employer; indeed, government has a hard
enough time simply determining what the minimum wage should be and has
104. See, e.g., Fried, supra note 97.
105. See, e.g., Summers, supra note 38.
106. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
107. Pp. 153-54.
108. Id.
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proven utterly incapable of correcting the pay disparities between men and
women in jobs of arguably comparable worth.109
Where the government does undertake regulation, as in the occupational
safety and health area, the rules necessarily must be stated generally in order
to encompass the wide variety of workplaces that will be covered. The conse-
quence is uncertainty as to the law's meaning when applied to the particulars
of each workplace, with inevitable delay and transaction costs. Attempts to
avoid this result through insistence upon compliance with rigid, specific com-
mands imposes inefficiencies of a different kind. Workplaces vary enormously,
and different approaches are likely to be optimal at different workplaces. A
rigid command applicable to all preempts the opportunity for flexibility of
application. 110
Of greatest importance, whatever its success in other settings, government
regulation breaks down in the workplace for want of adequate enforcement.
Weiler points to OSHA as an example. The government does not have suffi-
cient resources to inspect-let alone to crack down on violations in-the
enormous number of workplaces in America.
As a result, enforcement depends upon the employees, who must bring the
violations to the government's attention. But in practice, Weiler reports, this
works only where the employees are unionized. Nonunion employees lack both
the information necessary to evaluate the potential dangers of their workplace
and the resources to hire the experts who could tell them what they need to
know. Nonunion employees are also unlikely to know what constitutes a
violation of OSHA or how to seek its correction. Moreover, most of these
employees would be unwilling to invoke the law even if they knew how, out
of fear of employer retaliation (a fear that is warranted in the nonunion work-
place because, as we shall see, reinstatement has proved an inadequate remedy
in the absence of a union in the workplace).'
Finally, Weiler like many others1 2 believes that "voice" is an important
interest of employees, i.e., that employees want to participate in shaping the
rules that govern their working environment. Government regulation takes
control of the workplace away from both employer and employees, imposing
rigid terms that may not correspond to either's desires. 3
For Weiler, collective bargaining is superior to government regulation in
all the respects just discussed. Employees participate with employers in shaping
rules that are tailored to their workplace and that reflect the interests of both.
109. P. 154.
110. Pp. 155-56.
111. Pp. 157-59. Weiler cites, as another example of a statute that has failed for want of adequate
enforcement, the NLRA itself. Violations are rampant, challenges thereto inexorably slow to be resolved,
and remedies wholly inadequate. Pp. 40-41, 233-73.
112. See. e.g., Gottesman, supra note I, at 367; Summers, supra note 38, at 26-27; Sunstein, supra
note 12, at 1059.
113. Pp. 159-61, 175, 181-83.
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Those rules are enforceable through informal mechanisms established in their
agreements that are cheaper, quicker, and more informed than those available
under public statutes."4
B. The Problems with Government Regulation, Applied to the Wrongful Dis-
charge Issue
Weiler underscores this contrast between government regulation and collec-
tive bargaining in his discussion of the discharge issue. Court litigation-the
mechanism by which government currently monitors wrongful discharge, e.g.,
discharges violative of public policy-has all the defects that Epstein ascribes
to it: high transaction costs, risk of error, and consequent defensive decision-
making by employers." 5 In addition, it is accessible only to the highest paid
employees, for only they have potential damage awards large enough to make
the cost of litigation a sensible investment."6 A less formal mechanism, such
as an administrative or arbitral process that might result in orders of rein-
statement, won't work because empirical evidence shows that reinstatement is
not a viable remedy in the absence of a union: the reinstated employee is not
welcomed by the employer and will be hounded out in the absence of an in-
plant organization to guard against employer abuse."7
Weiler's analysis of the shortcomings of government regulation is compel-
ling.1 8 It leads to his embrace of collective bargaining as the preferred meth-
od of workplace governance." 9 However, it is worth taking note of Weiler's
search for the "second best" solution to the discharge problem, i.e., the role the
law should play in the absence of a union. Government regulation is better than
the market, he says. 2° But what type of government regulation? That, Weiler
suggests, depends on the nature of the challenge to the discharge.'
114. Pp. 181-85.
115. Pp. 80-81, 156-57.
116. Pp. 81-82.
117. Pp. 85-87. Accord Getman, Labor Arbitration and Dispute Resolution, 88 YALE L.J. 916, 934-38
(1979); Hyde, Entdangered Species (Book Review) 91 COLUM. L. REV. 456, 461 n.16 (1991) (reviewing
P. WEILER, supra note 12).
118. I should not overstate Weiler's disapproval of government regulation, see, e.g., p. 159, nor my
own. Even in unionized settings, government regulation plays an important role where there is potential
for division among employees that may disable some unions from battling vigorously for an end that society
values, such as the elimination of employer discrimination that Congress sought to achieve in Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e. There are also issues that are so complex that unions
cannot be expected invariably to be able to afford the level of expertise necessary to hold their own with
employers as, for example, in the cases of OSHA and ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461.
Finally, in nonunion settings, government regulation is often a better second-best solution than reliance
on the market place. Unless we are prepared to say that those who reject unionism forfeit the public's
interest in protecting, e.g., their right to receive a minimum wage, we must be prepared to build a safety
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Weiler approves of court litigation in the same categories of cases as does
Epstein: public policy tort claims and breach of contract claims. With respect
to the former, Weiler contends that it is appropriate to lower the boom on
employers who offend public policy, and the prospect of punitive damages will
make these cases viable; and Weiler would permit court litigation of breach of
contract claims because it is appropriate that the parties' expectations from
agreements be fulfilled.
However, in the absence of public policy torts or contracted-for protection
against job loss, Weiler would not afford employees access to court but instead
would provide them minimal protection delivered through informal administra-
tive proceedings. Legal protection would be extended only to senior employees,
reflecting Weiler's view that only the career relationship justifies legal interven-
tion. Claims would be processed through a very informal process, perhaps as
an additional item to be resolved in unemployment compensation proceedings.
And a finding of discharge without cause would merely entitle the employee
to an award of severance pay predicated on length of service.1
22
Weiler settles for severance pay delivered administratively because he
thinks the costs to employers of defending suits in court are disproportionate
to the benefits employees are likely to achieve; it would be unacceptable to
generate large damage awards through a process as informal as the one he





This seems a disappointing denouement to Weiler's saga of the career
employee. We have been led up the mountain by an impassioned demonstration
that the modern employee is locked into a relationship vital to her existence
which cannot be replicated elsewhere, and that this circumstance cries out for
legal protection. But we are then told that in the absence of contractual pro-
tection the employee should receive a small amount of severance pay as the
sole compensation for the unjustified elimination of her lifetime investment in
the employer. 4 One can hear Richard Epstein chuckling in the wings that
Weiler has professed not to buy the at-will doctrine, indeed to find it "morally
untenable,"12 yet ultimately proposes as a substitute a system which differs
from at-will employment only in the rather trivial respect that it would afford
wrongfully terminated employees a few weeks' severance pay.
122. Pp. 100-02. Veiler suggests as an alternative a system of "no-fault severance pay" that would
be available to all long-service employees without the requirement of a finding that good cause was lacking.
P. 102 n.100.
123. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
124. This disappointment would be substantially mollified, of course, if courts invariably found that
employees positioned as career employees have implied-in-fact contracts, but if that happened the result
would be the same as creating a general just cause protection enforceable in court, the very notion that
Weiler thinks objectionable. P. 101.
125. P. 68.
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To be sure, Weiler can envision a world with stronger remedies. His
reluctance to champion one flows from his assumption that reinstatement is an
unrealistic remedy for nonunion employees. But as I will describe in the next
section, Weiler makes a proposal later in the book that would bridge this gap:
mandating in-house worker committees in every workplace to monitor the
employer's compliance with the applicable employment laws (including compli-
ance with contracts). 26 This step would provide the monitoring presence that
today is found only where a union is present. If a monitoring presence existed,
and employees therefore could be reinstated with meaningful protection against
employer harassment, there would be no reason to sell short Weiler's vaunted
career employee with nothing but severance pay. 27 But that is a form of
collective employee dealing, and does not rebut Weiler's demonstration of the
inadequacy of government regulation absent a regime of collective dealing.
We must recall, though, that we are discussing Weiler's second-best solu-
tion. His first is collective bargaining, pursuant to which a discharged employee
would have prompt access to an arbitral reinstatement remedy (which would
be meaningful because it would be policed by a union) and full backpay.la
Weiler's difficulty in finding a second-best solution is perhaps implicit support
for his first. The very difficulty in fashioning a satisfactory means for govern-
mental deliverance of protection against wrongful discharge is proof of the
superiority of collective bargaining as the mechanism for governing the work-
place.
Ill. WEILER ON COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
Having stated the case for collective bargaining by indirection-i.e., having
located the deficiencies in the market and in government regulation-Weiler
turns to his positive task: stating the case for collective bargaining directly. He
begins, as he must, by addressing the hypothesis that the decline in the inci-
dence of collective bargaining shows that it is not a desirable means for order-
ing the private workplace. It is Weiler's thesis that the decline is attributable
to defects that are not inherent in collective bargaining and that are correctible.
He then prescribes the means for correction. Finally, because collective bargain-
ing will never become universal, he proffers an alternative model of collective
dealing that he would make mandatory in all workplaces, unionized or not:
work councils modeled after those mandated by German law.
126. Pp. 286-87. See infra notes 185-93 and accompanying text. This is but a small part of a more
ambitious agenda Weiler proposes for such committees. As I explain later, infra notes 177-93 and accompa-
nying text, I support the use of such committees for the law-enforcement function, but doubt their efficacy
for the other tasks Weiler would assign them.
127. Weiler makes this very point in chapter 6, where he advocates in-house worker committees. Pp.
286-87.
128. Weiler would modify existing law in one respect, allowing a discharged employee to take her
own case to arbitration if the union declined. Pp. 90-93.
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A. Where Have All the Members Gone?
Weiler does not doubt that collective bargaining is the best mechanism for
regulating the workplace, but he must confront and explain the steady decline
of its hold on the American workforce. Weiler posits two possible explanations
for the decline: a drop in the demand for unions (worker lack of interest) or
a drop in the supply of unions (employer conduct rendering unions inaccessible
to employees).
129
Weiler notes three possible causes of a drop in demand and, while acknowl-
edging that each has probably played some role, suggests that all, collectively,
cannot account for the major part of the decline. First, the American workplace
has changed demographically, from manufacturing to service, blue-collar to
white-collar, rust belt to sun belt.130 But, Weiler notes, many of the emerging
occupations are unskilled or semi-skilled and resemble those where unions
traditionally flourished: the five fastest growing occupations in America today,
in terms of numbers of employees, are cashier, registered nurse, janitor, truck
driver, and waiter/waitress.13 1 Of these, only nurses typify the changed de-
mography, yet ironically that is the one group among the five that is currently
unionizing to a substantial degree.
31
Second, unions were slow to react to the changing economic climate of the
past several decades, and polls showed that they were dropping in popularity
among American workers.133 But unions have made some adjustments, and
since 1981 there has been a dramatic turnabout in public perceptions of unions;
polls now consistently show that a substantial majority of the American public
believes that unions are the best instrument for protecting employee interests
in the workplace. 34 Yet the decline in union representation has continued un-
abated, suggesting that something else besides disapproval of unions as institu-
tions is at work.
35
A third possible cause for a drop in the demand for unions is that many
employers have switched to furnishing career relationships to employees, thus
diminishing employee dissatisfaction with their terms and conditions of employ-
ment. t36 But this cannot account for the decline in unionism in industries
129. P. 106.
130. Pp. 106-07.
131. P. 108 n.7.
132. Pp. 107-08, 108 n.7. Indeed, accelerated organization among nurses can be anticipated in light
of the Supreme Court's recent upholding of the Board's rule that nurses in acute care hospitals constitute
an appropriate bargaining unit unto themselves. American Hosp. Ass'n v. NLRB, __ U.S __ 111 S. Ct. 1539
(1991).
133. P. 298 n.88.
134. Pp. 299-300; see also pp. 298 n.88, 108-09 n.8. At the same time, the polls reflect a public
perception that unions have become too weak (in large part due to employer intimidation of employees)
to protect those interests adequately. Pp. 299-300 n.90.
135. Pp. 106-07 n.3.
136. See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
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where policies remain unchanged and where the conditions resemble those that
traditionally led to unionization.
In light of the analytic weaknesses of all three of these explanations, Weiler
concludes that a major part of the story lies on the supply side. He suggests
that employers are systematically denying their employees the opportunity to
unionize by committing flagrant violations of the NLRA that destroy at the
outset any impetus for unionization.'37 The extent of this phenomenon is not
measurable simply in the number of violations committed or elections lost, for
these are but the tip of the iceberg. Employees know that to convert their
workplace from the conventional status of nonunion into a unionized workplace
they must run a gauntlet that has little chance of succeeding (only one-fifth of
the employees who vote in NLRB elections following organizing drives ulti-
mately become covered by collective bargaining agreements) 3 ' and carries
high risks of job loss (one in every ten workers who supports a union is fired
for her efforts). 39 Weiler posits that employees are not willing to gamble
their jobs on such odds. 140
Weiler notes that while not every employer will be disposed to violate the
law, good employers get the benefit of the fear that is instilled by the bad: the
percentage of employees who believe their employer would punish union
supporters far exceeds the percentage of employers who do.' 4' Thus, Weiler
concludes that terror, not lack of interest, accounts for much of the unwilling-
ness of American workers today to opt for unionism.
42
137. Pp. 111-18.
138. Seep. 240. Roughly 40% of the employees whose workplaces are the subject of an NLRB election
wind up with a union certified as bargaining representative, but unions obtain collective bargaining agree-
ments following certification in only half the cases. Id. It bears emphasizing that the workplaces where
NLRB elections are conducted are those chosen by the union for organizing, and in which at least 30% of




141. Pp. 113-14. Weiler reports that in a 1984 Lou Harris Poll of nonunion employees "43 percent
believed that their own employer would fire, demote or take other retaliatory measures against employees
who visibly supported the union." P. 117 n.25.
142. Pp. 113-14, 240-41. veiler finds corroboration for this diagnosis in the contrast between the
degrees of unionism in Canada and the United States. The demographics of the two countries are similar,
as are the basic structures of their labor laws, but the rate of unionization in Canada is much higher than
in the United States. Pp. 254-55, 280. A principal factor that distinguishes the rate of unionization in the
two countries, Weiler suggests, is that the Canadian laws are more effectively enforced and employers do
not violate them. Without the terror, workers have opted for unionism at much higher rates. Id.
The explanation for the difference in rates of unionization in Canada and the U.S. has been the subject
of innumerable studies, and Weiler's analysis represents the consensus view: although many factors influence
the difference in unionization rates between the U.S. and Canada, the primary reason is the difference in
labor laws. See, e.g., Chaison & Rose, New Directions and Divergent Paths: The North American Labor
Movements in Troubled Times, Aug. 1990 LAB. L.J. 591,591: Bruce. Political Parties and Labor Legislation
in Canada and the U.S., 28 INDUS. REL. 115 (Spring 1989); Freeman, The Changing Status of Unionism
Around the World, in ORGANIZED LABOR AT THE CROSSROADS Ill (W. Huang ed. 1989).
However, a dissenting view has been put forward recently by Leo Troy. See Troy, Is the U.S. Unique
in the Decline of Private Sector Unionism?, II J. LAB. RES. 111 (1990) [hereinafter Troy, Is the U.S.
Unique]; Troy, Will a More Interventionist NLRA Revive Organized Labor?. 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
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B. What Will Reverse the Decline in Collective Bargaining?
Weiler discusses three strategies which, used in combination, he believes
might restore collective bargaining to its preeminent role in American labor
law: amending the NLRA to remove inhibitions to unionization; self-restructur-
ing by the labor movement to afford greater autonomy to the employees
themselves in shaping and negotiating their workplace agendas; and creating
a second tier of collective employee participation in the workplace modeled
after the German works councils.
1. Amending the NLRA
By far the most important and analytically persuasive of Weiler's proposals
are those for amending the NLRA. This is not new ground; Weiler authored
two articles in the early 1980's that constitute the definitive critique of the
NLRA, 14 3 and this part of the book represents a condensation (and slight
updating) of the views contained in those articles.
Weiler posits three central weaknesses of the NLRA: it fails in its stated
purpose to protect employees against employer retaliation for attempting to
unionize;1" it fails in its stated purpose to induce employers to negotiate in
good faith to reach agreement;145 and it fails in its stated purpose to arm
employees with economic weapons that will equalize the parties' respective
bargaining powers.1 46 Employers beat the system by bullying employees out
of unionization, by cold-shouldering those who are brave enough to vote for
a union nonetheless, and by hiring permanent replacements for those suicidal
enough to attempt to inflict bargaining pressure through a strike. 47 Weiler's
proposed amendments attempt to correct these three weaknesses.
583 (1990). Troy contends that the rate of unionization in the private sector in Canada is in the beginning
stages of decline. He posits that Canada lagged behind the U.S. in the shift from manufacturing to service
and in structural changes within manufacturing and private services, so that the trend that hit the U.S. earlier
is only now occurring in Canada. He also asserts that the decline in private sector unionism has been masked
by Canada's lead over the U.S. in the growth of public services and an accompanying meteoric rise in public
sector unionism. He posits further that with the new trade agreement between the two countries, Canada
will be under increased competitive pressures which will accelerate the decline of private sector unionism.
See Troy, Is the U.S. Unique, supra, at 113. Weiler implicitly recognizes these concerns in his observation
that "while the present situation of Canadian unions is far better than that of their U.S. counterparts, the
prospects for collective bargaining in the Canadian private sector are not particularly rosy, despite the more
favorable legal framework." P. 280 n.72 (citing an analysis of Canadian trends by N.M. Meltz, Unionism
in the Private Service Sector: A Canada-U.S. Comparison (University of Toronto, 1989) (unpublished
ma script)).
143. Weiler, Promises To Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to Self-Organization Under the NLRA, 96
HARV. L. REV. 1769 (1983); Weiler, Striking a New Balance: Freedom of Contract and the Prospects for




147. See supra notes 137-42, infra notes 148-55, and accompanying text.
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First, Weiler proposes amendments that would impose meaningful con-
straints on employers' firing or otherwise punishing workers who attempt to
unionize. The NLRA's existing remedies are too trivial to deter violations and
come too late to salvage the unionization effort once the employer's misconduct
has squelched it: discharged employees, if ultimately found to have been
discharged for union activity-and this finding will not come until months or
years after the organizing drive is over-will be awarded nothing more than
reinstatement and lost earnings (discounted by earnings that were or could have
been received in substitute employment). 148 Weiler's proposals provide both
speed (injunctive relief reinstating the employee prior to the election) and
remedial teeth.14 9 As to the latter, Weiler would amend the NLRA to remove
the Act's preemptive effect so that state courts could entertain claims of anti-
union discharge as public policy torts and award tort remedies, including
compensatory and punitive damages.15 I have recently published an article
suggesting that an amendment is not necessary to achieve this-the Supreme
Court could decree it under the existing statute. 51 As that article indicates,
I share Weiler's view that tort sanctions for antiunion discharges would be a
significant deterrent.
152
With respect to the other weaknesses Weiler identifies in the existing NLRA
scheme-the employer's ability to avoid agreement through bad faith negotiat-
ing and superior bargaining power-Weiler proposes a package of interrelated
amendments: stiffer penalties for employers who negotiate in bad faith to avoid
reaching a first agreement with a newly certified union;5 ' a ban on permanent
replacement of strikers for the first six months of a strike; 154 and an exception
from the secondary boycott laws to enable unions to request that employees




151. Gottesman, supra note 1, at 394-410.
152. Id. at 369-72. Weiler also proposes that the United States adopt the Canadian system of "instant
elections," whereby an election is held within a few days of a union's petition. Weiler suggests that the long
election campaign in the U.S. provides the employer the opportunity to wreak terror. Pp. 253-61.
153. Weiler explains that in Canada when an employer negotiates in bad faith over an initial contract
the remedy is compulsory arbitration over the terms of that contract. Weiler suggests that this remedy will
likely be too strong for American tastes, given the national preoccupation with the principle of freedom of
contract and the administrative burdens that would attend any effort to impose contracts through arbitration.
Weler suggests, however, that compensatory remedies for refusals to bargain would be a second-best solu-
tion. Pp. 249-51; cf. Ex-Cell-O Corp., 185 N.L.R.B. 107 (1970).
154. Pp. 264-69. Weiler is in this respect quite restrained. Bills are now pending in Congress that would
forbid hiring of permanent replacements at any time. S. 55, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); H.R. 5, 102d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
155. Pp. 269-73. Weiler considers and rejects yet another NLRA reform that has considerable support:
providing unions equal access to the employer's premises during organizing drives. See, e.g., Gottesman,
supra note 1, at 411-18, sources cited at 414 n.220 therein; see also Block, Redressing the Imbalance in
the Law of Union Representation Elections: The Principle of Workplace Neutrality, Proceedings of the Forty-
Third Annual Meeting of the Industrial Relations Research Association (Dec. 28-30, 1990). Weiler does
not dispute the justice of the reform, but believes that it would be of limited utility and is not worth the
investment in political capital necessary to obtain it. Pp. 242-43. I agree with Weiler that from a practical
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Weiler's package of NLRA amendments is a wish list that far exceeds what
anyone thinks legislatively attainable at present, given the potential for filibuster
in the Senate and presidential veto. But it is doubtful that anything short of
what he proposes could overcome the obstacles to collective bargaining that
exist in the present NLRA minefield.
2. Restructuring Labor Unions
Weiler contends that large, industrial unions (at least as they have func-
tioned traditionally) are ill-suited to organizing the new breed of workers in our
changing workplaces. These unions, which developed after passage of the
Wagner Act and organized the large manufacturing industries such as auto and
steel, negotiate industry-wide or company-wide agreements of great length and
specificity to govern large numbers of workplaces. t56 In Weiler's view, these
institutional structures are not well-suited to the new work environment, in
which employers need greater flexibility in their operations to respond to
changes in competitive markets and career employees desire a greater voice in
setting their own workplace agendas than is possible when negotiating is done
nationwide.
157
Weiler declares that we are entering an era in which the institutional form
preferred by employees will be "enterprise unionism,"' 58 i.e., union structures
that enable the agenda to be shaped at the workplace level by those immediately
affected and employment agreements that leave room for flexibility in respond-
ing to unforeseen circumstances. 59 Weiler argues that it is possible for indus-
trial unions to delegate the autonomy necessary to achieve this, and cites as
proof the General Motors-United Auto Workers Saturn Plant agreement: that
agreement is not only plant-specific but also is just a fraction of the size of
traditional auto agreements and remits most questions to ad hoc resolution at
the plant level, as they arise, by the parties directly affected. 6
While employee voice and employer flexibility are the considerations that
prompt Weiler to champion enterprise unionism, he has not overlooked that in-
standpoint this is a less important injustice than others he proposes to correct. Gottesman, A Union Lawyer's
Reaction to Proposalsfor a "New Path" for Employee Representation Rights, Proceedings of the Forty-Third
Annual Meeting of the Industrial Relations Research Association (Dec. 28-30, 1990). But I wonder whether,






160. Pp. 203-04. The Saturn Plant agreement is an exemplar of "relational contracts"-those that remit
resolution of future contingencies to later decisionmaking by the parties instead of trying to dictate a solution
at the time of initial contracting. See Goetz & Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REV.
1089 (1981); MacNeil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under Classical. Neoclassi-
cal, and Relational Contract Law, 72 NW. U. L. REV. 854, 870-73 (1978); Williamson, supra note 13, at
67-70.
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house employee negotiators will need resources that only a national organiza-
tion can provide. Here is where he sees a meaningful role for the industrial
unions. Because these unions are so large, they are able to aggregate large sums
of money to finance the acquisition of experts to deal with complex workplace
issues such as safety and health, fringe benefits, etc. He sees these unions
becoming service providers, furnishing expert assistance to in-house negotiators
on matters requiring specialization.161
Weiler's advice to the labor movement is that it had better restructure itself
to accommodate these changing tastes, or else it will hold no appeal to the
modern worker. My own view is that, while Weiler undoubtedly has a point,
he generalizes an insight that has limited application.
Certainly there are employees in many occupations and with many employ-
ers whose willingness to unionize will depend upon the employees' ability to
retain autonomy at the local level. But I doubt that that will be universally true.
For example, I doubt that the reluctance of cashiers, janitors, truck drivers, and
waiters/waitresses to unionize-and these, recall, are four of the five fastest
growing occupations 6 -can be attributed to a desire for greater voice in
shaping their workplace agendas. 63 For these categories, as Weiler's own
analysis of the causes of union decline confirms, the defects in the NLRA are
the real obstacle to unionization. 16 I predict that if we implemented Weiler's
NLRA reforms, vast numbers of employees in these occupations would join
existing union structures overnight.
There is, in short, a need for many different union structures to accommo-
date many different workplace settings in our changing economy. As Weiler
reports, the labor movement has been studying this very point,165 and tradi-
tional economists will assure us that, if there is indeed a market for a particular
kind of unionism, then providers will emerge who are ready to meet those
needs.
However, I am not as confident as Weiler that the needs of the new breed
of technical and professional employees will be met through transformation of
existing unions. It seems far likelier that new institutions will evolve that are
suited to the special interests of these employees. One need only observe the
history of what is currently America's largest labor organization to see how this
might occur.1 66 The National Education Association (NEA) began as an orga-
nization that concentrated on issues relating to the quality of education. Over
161. Pp. 208, 309.
162. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
163. Matthew Finkin, supra note 37, agrees that "[blue collar workers especially do not appear to be
deeply interested in participating directly in managerial decisions other than those they perceive as having
an immediate impact upon themselves."
164. See supra notes 137-42 and accompanying text.
165. Pp. 219, 292.
166. The National Education Asssociation became the nation's largest labor organization in the late
1980's, as its membership approached two million. 25 Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 964 (July 13, 1987).
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the past two decades, however, its leaders and members have transformed it
into an aggressive labor organization. 67 In most respects, the NEA fulfills
Weiler's image of a decentralized institution where local voice is paramount
in determining workplace governance rules and the national organization
provides services that support local bargaining units.6 ' We should expect that
an evolution of this type-transformation of a professional standards organiza-
tion into a labor organization-will be the means by which many professionals
and technicians will find their way to collective bargaining. Weiler's vision of
organization from without by existing unions thus will not be the whole
story.'6 9
3. Mandating Works Councils
Weiler acknowledges that revitalization of collective bargaining cannot
possibly produce total unionization in America, and he proffers a proposal that
would bring some measure of collective participation to all workers. He would
make mandatory the creation of Employee Participation Committees (EPC's)
in all workplaces. t 0
These Committees, which would be financed primarily by compulsory
employer contributions,' would perform some (not all) of the functions of
works councils in Germany. They would be indigenous to the individual
workplace, would be staffed by representatives chosen by the employees, and
would consult with management about a wide range of issues-wider than the
list of mandatory bargaining subjects under the NLRA. 172 Employers would
be required to inform the EPCs not only of all policies relating to wages, hours,
and terms and conditions of employment-the subjects on which employers are
bound to negotiate under the NLRA1 3 -but also of entrepreneurial decisions
that would affect the employees' work-lives but that the employer has no
167. A. WEST, THE NATIONAL EDUCATION ASSOCIATION: THE POWER BASE FOR EDUCATION 21-27,
39-87 (1980).
168. P. 222 n.50.
169. On one related point I agree with Weiler completely. He notes that the NLRA impedes the
development of new forms of unionism through its ban on "company unions" and the exclusion from the
Act's protections of those who are allotted any participation in making managerial decisions. Pp. 211-18.
(The exclusion of managerial employees from the Act's coverage does not appear on the face of the Act,
but was inferred by the Board and has been upheld repeatedly by the Supreme Court. See NLRB v. Yeshiva
Univ., 444 U.S. 672 (1980); NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974)). In workplaces where
employees are invited to participate in managerial decisions, the price of acceptance should not be forfeiture
of the right to unionize. And where employers are prepared to finance employee organizations to function
in such a participatory environment, we should welcome these initial steps down a road that may lead to
in the employees opting for a stronger version of collective action. Thus, as Weiler proposes, the ban on
company unions in § 8(a)(2) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2), should be abolished and the Act's prote-
ctions should be extended, at least to those whose managerial roles are limited in scope. Pp. 217-18.
170. Pp. 284-95.
171. Weiler would require the employees to pay some amount to finance the Committees, and the
employer to pay a multiple of each employee's contribution. P. 289.
172. Pp. 285-87.
173. §§ 8(a)(5)-8(d) NLRA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(5), 158(d).
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obligation under the NLRA to discuss with employees.'74 The EPC, like the
shareholders and the Board of Directors, would be entitled to information
respecting the "broader financial, investment, and profit situation of the
firm."'175 The employer would be obliged to meet periodically and consult
with the employee representatives of the EPC.
76
Weiler is not alone in proposing that the information and consultation
features of the German works council law be carried over to the American
workplace; this recommendation has become quite the vogue. 177 For the life
of me, I do not understand why. Granted, labor relations go swimmingly in
Germany as compared to the United States. But the features that these scholars
seek to transplant are but a small part of a much larger mosaic that regulates
German labor law, and it is that larger mosaic that explains the success of the
works councils.
To begin with, although only 40% of the German workforce belongs to
unions, 90% of German workers are covered by collective bargaining agree-
ments which the unions hammer out on a national, industrywide, or areawide
basis. 178 The agreements set basic terms and conditions for all workplaces in
the industry. 179 The works councils function alongside that basic structure.
They perform the role that might be played by a local union in a large Ameri-
can industrial union, working out terms that are specific to the particular
location. They differ, however, in that they are not a part of the union, but a
distinct workplace-specific institution enjoying autonomous control of the local
issues that are within their jurisdiction. That local agenda is ambitious indeed,
including both overseeing compliance with the law and the collective agree-
ments and formulating the rules that will govern such matters as scheduling
vacations, establishing plant rules and discipline, setting job and piece rates,
restructuring and designing jobs, and instituting safety measures. As to all these
174. P. 288; cf. First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981).
175. P. 288.
176. P. 285.
177. Clyde Summers has compared the German system with that of the U.S. and, while arguing that
German works councils cannot be transplanted into the U.S., has attempted to construct a codetermination
model for the U.S., incorporating the information and consultation elements of the concept as a starting point
for discussion. Summers, Codetermination in the United States: A Projection of Problems and Potentials,
4 J. COMP. CORP. L. & SOC. REG. 155 (1982); seealso Summers, An American Perspective of the German
Model of Worker Participation, 8 COMP. LAB. L.J 333 (1987) [hereinafter Summers, An American
Perspective]. A more direct case for adoption of the information and consultation elements in the U.S. has
recently been proposed by Janice Bellace. J. Bellace, Mandating Employee Consultation and Information
Rights, Proceedings of the Forty-Third Annual Meeting of the Industrial Relations Research Association
(Dec. 28-30, 1990).
The works council idea has also been widely advocated in Canada. See Adams, Should Works Councils
Be Used as Industrial Relations Policy?, MONTHLY LAB. REV. July 25, 1985; Adams & Rummell, Workers'
Participation in Management in West Germany: Impact on the Worker, the Enterprise, and Trade Union,
8 INDUs. REL. J. 4 (1977); Beatty, Constitutionalizing a Labour Code: Creative Uses of Comparative Law,
8 COMP. LAB. L.J. 211 (1987).
178. Summers, The Usefulness of Unions in a Major Industrial Society-A Comparative Sketch, 58




matters, the council has not merely the right to receive information and consult
(the powers that Weiler and others would transport to the U.S.) but the power
to secure a binding resolution from a neutral decisionmaker if the parties do
not agree (i.e., "codetermination"180).
Weiler and his colleagues all agree that this last aspect-interest arbitration
in the American terminology-stands no chance of gaining political acceptance
in America. Employers would resist mightily any legislative proposal to divest
them of control over their operations, would protest the transfer of decision-
making to neutrals who could not possibly possess the knowledge and expertise
enjoyed by management, and would find political paydirt in the deep-seated
American commitment to freedom of contract."' Weiler and his colleagues
would, accordingly, borrow the information and consultation steps of the
German system without the decisionmaking step.
To advocate the enactment of such an information and consultation scheme
seems to me a prodigious waste of scarce political resources. Without a terminal
point, these consultations would be meaningless exercises. Weiler points out
that if employees become frustrated by their inability to secure resolution of
the issues discussed in these committees, they can always form a union to
acquire leverage. 8 2 Indeed, one suspects that Weiler's real hope is that these
EPC's would give the workers a whiff of collective participation that would
prod them into unionizing. I fear, however, that they would create the opposite
impression: that collectivization produces mere frustration.
Moreover, I doubt that an effort to impose even these loose tea-parties on
American employers through legal compulsion would be successful. In Germa-
ny, the employers are already dealing with unions and are merely distributing
the locus of bargaining between two different sites, some national and some
local. However, in America, many employers are dedicated to achieving a
union-free environment. If employers bargain in bad faith with impunity under
the NLRA,183 why should we assume that they would be any more forthcom-
ing under an EPC law? How will we compel them to share with these commit-
180. Id. at 1416; Waschke, Workers' Participation in Management in the Nine European Community
Countries, 7 ComP. LAB. L.J. 83, 86-88 (1977). Codetermination is not applicable to certain entrepreneurial
decisions such as the decision to relocate. There, the Works Council Act provides only for informing and
consulting-the same process that would be applicable here under the Weiler proposal. Summers, An
American Perspective, supra note 177, at 347-48. But that unionized employers in Germany governed by
this network of laws engage meaningfully in such discussions (if they do) is no predictor of how America's
nonunion employers would behave. It is one thing to expect employers to deal seriously with an entity that
has leverage in other aspects of the relationship, and quite another to expect employers to deal seriously
with an entity that has no leverage anywhere. See iufra notes 183-84 and accompanying text.
181. Pp. 289-90.
182. P. 290. Under Weiler's proposal, every workplace, including those that are unionized, would have
a statutory committee. The unionized employees could, if they choose, select their union to perform the
committee functions, but need not. If the union were selected, the nonbargaining unit employees in the
workplace would be entitled to choose their own representatives. Pp. 293-95. The potential existence of
dual representatives for unionized employees contains the seeds for much mischief.
183. See supra text accompanying notes 145-47, 153-55.
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tees their secret financial information and plans? Earlier Weiler made a telling
demonstration of the weaknesses of government regulation,114 yet he would
attempt to impose a continuing obligation on employers that would be unwel-
come and notoriously difficult to enforce.
All this is not to say that there is not a germ of an idea lurking within the
EPC suggestion. While I think it meaningless to mandate superficial consulta-
tions, in-house committees to monitor the employer's compliance with legal and
contractual dictates-one among the many functions Weiler would assign to
such committees' 85 -seems an exceedingly good idea.
t86
Recall that earlier Weiler has shown that reinstatement of wrongfully dis-
charged employees is unsuccessful in nonunion workplaces because there is no
union to monitor the employer's postreinstatement treatment of the employ-
ees."87 Recall further that he has shown that OSHA is not enforced in non-
union workplaces because there is no union to provide the expertise necessary
to identify and follow through in eliminating violations.'88 These are but
instances of a more general proposition: that enforcement of any legal norm
in the workplace, whether regulatory or contractual, depends on an employee
in-house presence that can serve both an informational function and as protector
against employer retaliation. Herein lies the kernel of a restricted form of
mandated committee-a law-enforcement committee that could police employer
compliance with the law and employee contracts, negotiate for resolution of
alleged violations, and prosecute allegations that are not resolved informally.
Federal law could require the formation of such a committee at every
workplace, with representatives elected by the employees. Because the com-
mittee would be performing a law-enforcement function, it would be appropriate
that the committee's activities be financed with government revenues."8 9 If
the committee is to function effectively, the amount of the government subsidy
would have to be sufficient to enable the committee to afford to contract for
the expert services needed to enforce the more complex laws such as OSHA
184. See supra Part II.
185. Pp. 286-87.
186. Moreover, I would suggest that union representatives, where they exist, automatically serve as
the committee representatives, at least on behalf of their bargaining unit members, to avoid the mischief
of dual representation. See supra note 182.
187. See supra text accompanying notes 117, 123.
188. See supra text accompanying notes 110-11.
189. Weiler proposes that the committee he champions, which would have many functions in addition
to law enforcement, be financed principally by the empinyer with a small contribution by the employees.
See supra note 171 and accompanying text. I doubt that the benefits we would derive from those broader
functions would justify the crippling competitive burdens the compelled contributions would place on
American employers operating in global markets. I discuss a similar point in Gottesman, Twelve Topics To
Consider Before Optingfor Racial Quotas, supra note 98. Limiting the committee's function to law enforce-
ment justifies placing the cost on the government instead, thus spreading the cost to all taxpayers. Note that
this is not the same as Epstein's assertion that redistribution should be the role of tax laws alone, for my
approach requires labor laws as well to determine how the revenues are to be distributed.
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and ERISA. Unions could offer those expert services, as Weiler's proposal con-
templates, 90 but others could provide them as well.
Because resort to the law is a meaningful terminal point to any problem not
resolved locally, and one that employers would in most instances find unpleas-
ant, there is reason to think that consultations would be productive under such
a regime. This strategy would address many of the weaknesses Weiler identifies
in government regulation today, by providing employees access to the informa-
tion and technical expertise necessary for effective invocation of the law, and
by enforcing their legal rights to be free of retaliation when they do invoke the
law.
I have had some personal experience with enforcement committees such as
these, established pursuant to consent decrees under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.19' There can be little doubt that these committees
"work," in that they ferret out arguable violations and elicit diligent efforts to
resolve them. Employers take such committees seriously because problems not
resolved at home will find their way into less hospitable judicial forums.
The existence of such committees at all workplaces would create broadened
options for the shape of government regulation. I have described Weiler's
account of the demerits of generic procrustean safety and health regulation that
is not tailored to the specifics of each workplace. 19 An alternative strategy
for government regulation, sometimes styled "reconstitutive law,"' 193 might
have government prescribe only broad objectives and delegate the selection of
the most cost-effective means to achieve those objectives to each employer and
its workplace committee.
Workplace law-enforcement committees, while having a natural appeal to
those who favor collective workplace decisionmaking, should also appeal to
those who favor government regulation. Weiler is most persuasive when he
argues that the absence of information, technical expertise, and insulation from
retaliation inhibits employees' invocation of their rights under public law. Thus,
this strategy could be pursued independent of efforts to overhaul the NLRA to
facilitate more traditional union organization, indeed even by those who do not
favor NLRA overhaul.
IV. CONCLUSION
Governing the Workplace is of immense value to those interested in the
future of American labor law. It is a kaleidoscopic journey, ranging from
190. P. 293.
191. For example, the Steel Industry Consent Decree, entered into in 1974, established committees at
virtually all steel plants in the United States to enforce the terms of the Decree as well as Title VII's
commands generally. United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Indus., Inc., 517 F.2d 826, 835 (5th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied sub nom. Harris v. Allegheny-Ludlum Indus., Inc., 425 U.S. 944 (1976).
192. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
193. See Stewart, Reconstitutive Law, 46 MD. L. REV. 86, 108-09 (1986).
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voluminous empirical data about the operation of the modern workplace to
scholarly analyses drawing on law, economics, industrial relations, and critical
theory. It contains an education about work, the law, and the intersection of the
two.
While Weiler has a decided point of view on all the issues he discusses,
he is scrupulously fair in laying out the competing views and acknowledging
the strengths of those positions. As a result, his book provides the reader with
a fair canvass of the range of scholarly and political debate about the workplace
today.
As I have described in this review, I agree with many of Weiler's contribu-
tions and find them effectively presented. His critique of the efficacy of govern-
ment regulation in the absence of a union is state of the art. The part of his
discussion of mandatory workplace committees in which he highlights their
potential for facilitating law enforcement provides the nucleus for a whole new
strategy for regulating the workplace. His pathology of the NLRA and diagno-
ses for its resuscitation likewise are the best available. And his description of
the evolution of industrial relations-from casual employment to employer
preference for career relationships-provides empirical data necessary to
evaluating our choice of legal strategies for governing the workplace.
I have identified three major areas where I believe his analysis falls short.
He accepts Epstein's challenge to show that government intervention in the
market is justified on efficiency grounds, but declares victory without waiting
for the final inning: while he chases Epstein out of the spot market, he does
not deliver a decisive blow on the bilateral monopoly issue that is then encoun-
tered. Moreover, Weiler's analysis abandons the neediest non-career employees,
although both efficiency and wealth distribution arguments exist for legal
protection of such employees." 4 Finally, his advocacy of mandatory works
councils for inform-and-consult functions seems ill-advised because such
committees are unlikely to succeed and securing them through legislation would
waste precious political capital.
These disagreements, however, do not shake my assessment of the overall
importance of this book. If one wishes to turn to a single book to gain an
understanding of the workplace today and of the themes of academic debate
about how the workplace should be governed, this book unquestionably is my
first choice.
194. My critique of Weiler on these points is not shared by Samuel Issacharoff, who finds Weiler's
"response to the neoclassical revival . . . perhaps the strongest individual section of Governing the
Workplace." Issacharoff, supra note 26, at 619. In Issacharoff's view, the "shakiest" part of Weiler's
analysis is the part I find most persuasive-Weiler's preference for collective bargaining over government
regulation. Id. at 627; see also id. at 627-33.
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and ERISA. Unions could offer those expert services, as Weiler's proposal con-
templates,1 0 but others could provide them as well.
Because resort to the law is a meaningful terminal point to any problem not
resolved locally, and one that employers would in most instances find unpleas-
ant, there is reason to think that consultations would be productive under such
a regime. This strategy would address many of the weaknesses Weiler identifies
in government regulation today, by providing employees access to the informa-
tion and technical expertise necessary for effective invocation of the law, and
by enforcing their legal rights to be free of retaliation when they do invoke the
law.
I have had some personal experience with enforcement committees such as
these, established pursuant to consent decrees under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.191 There can be little doubt that these committees "work,"
in that they ferret out arguable violations and elicit diligent efforts to resolve
them. Employers take such committees seriously because problems not resolved
at home will find their way into less hospitable judicial forums.
The existence of such committees at all workplaces would create broadened
options for the shape of government regulation. I have described Weiler's
account of the demerits of generic procrustean safety and health regulation that
is not tailored to the specifics of each workplace.1 92 An alternative strategy
for government regulation, sometimes styled "reconstitutive law,"'193 might
have government prescribe only broad objectives and delegate the selection of
the most cost-effective means to achieve those objectives to each employer and
its workplace committee.
Workplace law-enforcement committees, while having a natural appeal to
those who favor collective workplace decisionmaking, should also appeal to
those who favor government regulation. Weiler is most persuasive when he
argues that the absence of information, technical expertise, and insulation from
retaliation inhibits employees' invocation of their rights under public law. Thus,
this strategy could be pursued independent of efforts to overhaul the NLRA to
facilitate more traditional union organization, indeed even by those who do not
favor NLRA overhaul.
190. P. 293.
191. For example, the Steel Industry Consent Decree, entered into in 1974, established committees at
virtually all steel plants in the United States to enforce the terms of the Decree as well as Title VII's
commands generally. United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Indus., Inc., 517 F.2d 826, 835 (5th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied sub nom. Harris v. Allegheny-Ludlum Indus., Inc., 425 U.S. 944 (1976).
192. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
193. See Stewart, Reconstitutive Law, 46 MD. L. REv. 86, 108-09 (1986).
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IV. CONCLUSION
Governing the Workplace is of immense value to those interested in the
future of American labor law. It is a kaleidoscopic journey, ranging from
voluminous empirical data about the operation of the modern workplace to
scholarly analyses drawing on law, economics, industrial relations, and critical
theory. It contains an education about work, the law, and the intersection of the
two.
While Weiler has a decided point of view on all the issues he discusses,
he is scrupulously fair in laying out the competing views and acknowledging
the strengths of those positions. As a result, his book provides the reader with
a fair canvass of the range of scholarly and political debate about the workplace
today.
As I have described in this review, I agree with many of Weiler's contribu-
tions and find them effectively presented. His critique of the efficacy of govern-
ment regulation in the absence of a union is state of the art. The part of his
discussion of mandatory workplace committees in which he highlights their
potential for facilitating law enforcement provides the nucleus for a whole new
strategy for regulating the workplace. His pathology of the NLRA and diagno-
ses for its resuscitation likewise are the best available. And his description of
the evolution of industrial relations-from casual employment to employer
preference for career relationships-provides empirical data necessary to
evaluating our choice of legal strategies for governing the workplace.
I have identified three major areas where I believe his analysis falls short.
He accepts Epstein's challenge to show that government intervention in the
market is justified on efficiency grounds, but declares victory without waiting
for the final inning: while he chases Epstein out of the spot market, he does
not deliver a decisive blow on the bilateral monopoly issue that is then encoun-
tered. Moreover, Weiler's analysis abandons the neediest non-career employees,
although both efficiency and wealth distribution arguments exist for legal
protection of such employees.' 94 Finally, his advocacy of mandatory works
councils for inform-and-consult functions seems ill-advised because such
committees are unlikely to succeed and securing them through legislation would
waste precious political capital.
These disagreements, however, do not shake my assessment of the overall
importance of this book. If one wishes to turn to a single book to gain an
understanding of the workplace today and of the themes of academic debate
about how the workplace should be governed, this book unquestionably is my
first choice.
194. My critique of Weiler on these points is not shared by Samuel Issacharoff, who finds Weiler's
"response to the neoclassical revival . . . perhaps the strongest individual section of Governing the
Workplace." Issacharoff, supra note 26, at 619. In Issacharoff's view, the "shakiest" part of Weiler's
analysis is the part I find most persuasive-Weiler's preference for collective bargaining over government
regulation. Id. at 627; see also id. at 627-33.
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